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means of this, it runs against the present kind of cultural fatalism that professes disgust
for the banalities of current taste and the good-natured commonplaces of the global
culture industry. Let me cióse with Rudolf Kassner's words, taken from his essay Music
and Moráis:
"Nebenbeí. der Musiker wird die Tugenden des anderen ais ein Mittel gegen den
Fatalismus lieben und pflegen, gleichwie es seine eigene, hóchts personliche und
verschwiegene Tatigkeit bleibt, sich gegen den Fatalismus zu behaupten. Denn dort, wo
der Fatalismus der Inbegriff und Spiegel aller Tugenden ¡st, dort hórt der Musiker auf und
geht verloren. Der Musiker is kein Fatalist wie gerne er diesen auch vor Leuten oder vor
sich spielen mag. Er ist wesentlich kein Fatalist" (Kassner 1912, p. 115),
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/. Education Now and Four Hundred Years Ago: Rosa, Lorenzo and Dorotea
Once a year, music teachers at secondary schools in Spain must assume quite a
dífferent job and act as publicists. Music is an optional subject at secondary schools,
and if it does not attract enough students each year, it can even disappear from the
syllabus. This is the reason why teachers must spend the last weeks of each academic
year trying to convince their potential pupils of the advantages of choosing music as one
of their courses for the next year. If they do not succeed in such a task, they may be
asked to teach some of those subjects that are usually more popular among students,
such as Computer Science, Germán Language or even Philosophy. Many music teachers
carry out a veritable advertising campaign, with posters, brochures, lectures or musical
soirees, in order to exhibit the charms of music to teenagers. However, in the middle of
this marketing humbug, one can also find reasoned answers to the question of why
bother to learn music today. What could be the reasons to prefer music to computers,
languages or sports? Rosa Q. Ñ., one of the music teachers who carry out the
aforementioned campaigns, gives the following ones:
"I attempt to explain to my potential pupils that this subject will enable them to enjoy the
legacy of Western musicians such as Beethoven, Cage or De Victoria, and will also make
them become acquainted with and take pleasure in things produced by people from other
civilisations or ages. [...] This could eventually be a great help to them in order to better
appreciate today's and tomorrow's music. [...] If they like playing an instrument, my
classes will surely enable them to improve their performance skills, and if any of them is
interested in composing, I am certain that I could holp Ihem to come up with useful ideas
in order to write their own pieces." (Pérez Pueyo, 1999, 27)
If one thinks it over, it can be said that Rosa's line of argument is rather tautológica!:
learning music serves to know more about music; it enables you to listen, perform or
créate music ¡n a better way, better than if you had not learnt anything about music.
Simple as it may sound, the aim of musical education is, paraphrasing Verlaine (1884),
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-de la musique avaní toute chose". This might seem a bit too simple: what must
teaching music serve for, but to learn about musicl
Nevertheless, the thing ¡s that this did not sound like a platitude for European culture
some four hundred years ago, ñor during the previous two millenniums. During all that
time, getting into the artistic realm of the philharmonic muse Euterpe did not only serve
to get acquainted with the beauty of sounds, but brought about many other advantages
as well. Musical education was not just musical education, but also moral and political
education, and it provided the most valuable knowledge about the world, the gods and
human beings, or more precisely, about the cióse connection between the world, the
gods and human beings. Let us, for instance, look for a moment at Alessandro Striggio,
Jr., who wrote in 1607 the libretto for Monteverdi's L'Orfeo, which, by the way, was
the second opera ever written. The opera opened with an impersonation of Music, which
gives us a nice example of the sort of'marketing' techniques that a music teacher from
the beginning of the 17th century could have deployed in order to advertise the
advantages of musical education:
"lo la Música son, ch'ai dolci accenti
So far tranquillo ogni túrbalo core,
Et or di nobil ira et or d'amore
Poss'infiammar le piü gelate menti.
lo su cetera d'or cantando soglio
Mortal orecchío lusingar talora;
E in questa guisa all'armonia sonora
Dclla lira del ciel piü Taime invoglio." (Striggio, 1609, 66)
As we may here perceive, Music in person was much more ambitious than its
present-day defenders (such as Rosa) concerning the valúes it could offer to its
disciples. Even back in 1607, learning music served for more than just playing, singing,
writing or listening to music; that is to say, it served for purposes other than the strictly
musical ones. The impersonation of Music has other attractive gifts to proffer to its
disciples: it will enable them to manipúlate the mood of the listeners ("so far tranquillo
ogni túrbalo core"); move the audience to carry out acts of rage or acts of love ("or di
nobil ira et or di amare..."); and, most importantly, it will remind their soul that the
main harmony is not the one produced by conventional string or wind instruments, but a
'" "I am Music, who, with accents sweet/ can bring tranquil! ity to every troubled heart/ and now with noble
wrath, now with love/ can kindle even the iciest minds./ Singing to a golden lyre, I am wont/ sometimes to
charm mortal ears;/ and ín this way inspire souls with a longing/ for the sonorous harmony of heavens iyre."
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heavenly one supposedly emitted by the stars in their harmonic revolving ("della lira
del ciel piü I'al me invoglio").
The differences between the reasons given nowadays by teachers such as Rosa,
looking for new students, and the ones given in days of yore by opera characters such as
Striggio's Music are caused by something more than different rhetorical strategies. In
fact, although Alessandro Striggio is clearly more poetic and enthusiastíc than Rosa, his
proposals did not sound excessively metaphoric or pretentious to his contemporaries.
Even at the beginning of the 17th century, the art of music entailed not only the mere
harmony of voices or musical instruments, but also the harmony between human
passions and will; and these two kinds of harmony were the earthly reflection of a third
sublime harmony brought about by the stars moving around the sky with mathematical
regularity: a heavenly harmony that our unworthy ears could not perceive. Thus,
musical education certainly introduced human beings to the secrets of the lute and the
zither, of the soprano's song or the composer's scores; but, more importantly, it
presented human beings, at the same time, the secrets of the human soul, of the natural
world (in particular, the mysteries of its most sublime part: heaven) and to the enigma
of the harmonic unión between both humans and the world: "because (as Sextus
Empiricus put it) the entire universe is harmonically ruled" (Adversus Mathematicos,
VII, 95). Musical education was more than teaching how to produce or consume
music: it was teaching, by analogy, the particular laws of the human heart, soul and
spirit, and the particular ways in which heavenly objects fit with each other and with
human inner life. Music served to clarify the hidden harmony engraved by a Creator or
Demiurge in the whole Cosmos, with both human and natural counterparts.
11
 With the only exception of Pythagoras' ears; these, according to Porphyry, could hear "the universal
harmony of the spheres and the stars moving within those sphercs" (Diels and Kranz, 1956, 31, B129). The
other moríais are unablc to hear it since, as Aristolle says (De Cáelo, B 9, 290, b!2) "we perceive Ihe sound
from Ihe time we are born and, Iherefore, we cannot tell il apart from its conlrary, silence, because sound
and silence can only be dislinguished by mutual contras!. Thus, men have Ihe sanie problem as smiths, they
are so used lo noise Ihal Ihey do not nolice it."
12
 Diogenes Laertius refers lo mis same idea when he makes Philolaus say: "Nalure became harmonious inlo
the world [...], both Ihe universe and everylhing wilhin il" (Uves ofthe Philosophers, VIII, 85).
" Pylhagoras himself defended an image of Ihe world and Ihe soul as something put in order according to
musical harmony: henee, it can hardly be surprising thal, al Ihe same lime, he was Ihe firsl lo use Ihe word
Cosmos (Greek word for 'orderliness' as opposed lo Chaos, "disorder') wilh the aim of referring "to
everylhing as a whole, due to ils inherenl order", as we can read in Aetius (Diels and Kranz, 1956, 14,21).
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For this very reason, we find that 17th century intellectuals accept plainly the way
Music advertises herself in Striggio and Monteverdi's L'Orfeo. Her 'marketing
campaign' benefits of a little discussed and hardly debatable supposition that wholly
pervaded Europe's visión of the world. Among the innumerable existing instances of
this, the most outstanding one is perhaps that of the Shakespearian character Lorenzo, in
The Merchant of Venice, where he tells his wife in the utmost natural way:
"Sit, Jessica; look how the floor of heavens
Is thick ¡nlaid which patines of bright gold:
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
But in his motion like an ángel sings;
[...] But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly cióse it in, we cannot hear it..." (Act V, Scene I) '4
In fact, the idea that the universe could 'sing' was not a far-fetched one, since that
was what it did according to the cultural belief at that time: the sky movements, indeed,
could be regularly and astronomically predicted as long as they were a physical parallel
of the harmonic reguiarity of music or chant. When Shakespeare pointed out (in fact,
he rather presupposed) the valué of music as an indispensable key in order to
comprehend the physical world (especially all about astronomy: 'the floor of heaven'),
he was reaping the fruits of a notion that had exísted for nearly two millennia. This
notion bears out one of the two features that Striggio's Music advertised of herself, its
ability to make us know the world. In order to see the other feature, e.g., the valué of
music as the key to human subjectivity, we need to go back to the other great writer of
14
 The best example of these ideas within Spanish lyric poetry is the Oda a Francisco Salinas by Fray Luis de
León, which was written just a few years before Shakespeare's text and published only a few years later.
" According to Aristotle: "The movement of such big heavenly bodies musí produce some kind of sound, just
as happens when an earlhly body moves, although these have a smaller size and ¡ess speed. When the sun.
the moon and all the stars, which are so numerous and big, move so quickly, they must necessarily make an
amazingly strong sound. Considering Ihis, and taking into account the fact that their different speeds,
measured in relation to their distance, relate among themselves just like musical concord, they affirm that
this proves that the sound produced by the circular movement oí" the stars is harmonic" (De Cáelo, B 9, 290b
12). Shakespeare's view opposes Aristotle's explanation of why we cannot hear this heavenly music (see
note number 18), following Boethius' alternative theory (De institulione música, II), according to which it is
our earthly human condition ("this muddy vesture of decay") what deprives us of the ability to discern this
sublime sound.
"It seems, said I, that ears are tnade to perceive the harmonic movement, just like eyes are made for
astronomy, and that these two sciences are related to each other" (Plato, Republic, 530d).
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the 17th century in Europe, Miguel de Cervantes. In his most famous work, Don Quijote
and Sancho meet Dorotea, a young shepherdess who is lost in the valleys of Sierra
Morena; and she refers to her previous life as a Renaissance maid in a small Andalusian
town as follows:
"Los ratos que del día me quedaban después de haber dado lo que convenía a los
mayorales, capataces y otros jornaleros, los entretenía en ejercicios que son a las
doncellas tan lícitos como necesarios, como son los que ofrece la aguja y la almohadilla, y
la rueca muchas veces; y si alguna, por recrear el ánimo, estos ejercicios dejaba, me
acogía al entretenimiento de leer algún libro devoto, o a tocar una harpa, porque la
experiencia me mostraba que la música compone los ánimos descompuestos y alivia los
trabajos que nacen del espíritu.'" (El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha, I,
XXVIII; my italics)
Whereas Lorenzo described music as something essentially analogous to the
external world, in this extract from Cervantes music is presented as something
fundamentally linked to the events that take place in the interior of human beings: This
way, it is easy for music to get inside someone in order to "componer los ánimos
descompuestos y aliviar los trabajos que nacen del espíritu". Human psychology was in
18fact a matter of harmony, and this was not a simple metaphor at the time - although it
might seem so now, since we are used to the more scientific-like language of our
psychologists. The harmony of the sounds produced by a musical instrument could
percolate through the listener (or the performer) very easily and arrive inside her in
order to harmonize her whole interiority: it was a 'contagious' harmony that flowed
gently from Dorotea's harp towards her spirit, or from the stars in Shakespeare's sky to
17
 "Such parts of my day as remained after dealing with the stewards, the foremen, and the day-labourers, I
spent in occupations, which are so much rightful as necessary to young ladies: like sewing with my needles
and pincushion, and often spinning. And if I left these tasks at times to refresh my mind, I turned to the
recreation of some books of devotion or to playing the harp: for experience shoived me that music composes
disordered moods and eases the troubles which are born ofthe spirit."
8
 Both Plato (Phaedo, 85e-86d, 88d) and Aristotle take up the idea that "soul [...] is a kind of harmony" (De
anima, 407b-408a; Politics, 1340b 17-20). See also Diels and Kranz (1956, 44A23), Gottschalk (1971) and
García Gual (2000, 80-82). Lorenzo, in The Merchant of Vértice, did not completely ignore the presence of
music within the soul, and thus, in his above-mentioned speech, he recommends Jessica: "The man that hath
no music in himself,/ Ñor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,/ Is fit for treasons, stratagems and
spoils;/ The motions of his spirit are dul l as night,/ And his affections dark as Erebus:/ Let no such man be
trusted." This idea appears in the Oda a Francisco Salinas too, turning into a beautiful poetic summary that
unifies Lorenzo's images with Dorotea's reflections.
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the perfectly audible notes of a song (perfectly audible for Pythagoras at least). Music
had the privilege of reflecting the radical accord shared by the whole Cosmos. Thus,
teaching musical arts would open the door for students to study both about the world
and about themselves, becomíng wiser and perhaps even more moral, learning how to
be skilled mathematicians and good citizens too. What has come to pass in Europe for
such a promising musical education to turn into something that only serves to créate and
listen to music (or better: to produce and consume music )? What does the fact that we
have lost the visión of the world (Weltamchauung) that before used to associate music
with so many virtues imply for our Western culture? ¡s it possible to change the present
status quo and give music (and musicians, such as Bach) an educational role beyond the
strictly musical role? This article will try to fmd the answer to such questions. We will
first refer to the cultural evolution of Europe from Ancient Greece, so as to grasp better
what has made the role of music change from the privileged situation attested in
Striggio, Shakespeare and Cervantes to the modest position it is currently in. As we will
see, such a transformation does not only affect music as an academic subject, but it also
reflects a general shift that has been taking place throughout the histórica! evolution of
our European civilisation duríng the last two and a half millennia. This alteration has
consisted in the change from 1) a globally and metaphysically organised world, a
unitary world, governed by the same general principies: a pre-modern world; to 2) a
world Sacking a global organisation and divided into two halves (the Subject and the
Object), each one with an independent order; two halves between which understandable
contact is almost impossible: a modern world. Then, we will appreciate how the
principies that used to govern this second 'modern world' (and that had reduced music
to its merely musical role) are no longer acceptable. Given this situation, what should
we do? Should we bend over backwards to return to the pre-modern world and recover
the role that music had until the beginning of the 17th century? Should we instead créate
a brand new educational role for music, neither modern ñor pre-modern, but adapted to
the contemporary challenges of our particular cultural conditíon? The last section of this
article will try to outline this new programme, outside modern or pre-modern
guidelines, a programme that could well be dubbed as 'hermenéutica! ethics'.20
" See Small (1980), on the role of Western music as a product of consumerism in our time, as agaínst the
richness of its functions in other civilisations or in the past.
211
 In the sense proposed by Gadamer (1972b, 1974) and Vattimo (1988a; 1994, 37-52, 73-92), as we will see
later. See also Herrera Guevara (1999; 2000, 61-85) and Quintana Paz (2000b).
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2. History ofa Loss: From Pythagoras, íhrough Descartes, to Schopenhauer
2.1. The Salad Days of Europe, \vhen we al I were Pythagoreans
The general image of music as playing a structuring role of the reality, be it natural,
human or divine, was acceptable while Europe considered such a reality to be rationally
structured. Such a belief appears for the first time among Greek philosophers in the 6th
century BC, and it essentially endures until the 17th century AD (as may be seen in
examples such as the aforementioned ones). During this period, learning musical
harmony was basically the same as learning about the harmony of Nature, Humankind
and the Divinity. For centuries, Europe believed in the harmony of the Whole, teaching
music to children and teenagers in order to introduce them to such harmony. We have
labelled this stage of Western culture as its pre-modern epoch.
All Greek philosophers cared about reason because they thought it was the key to
access reality: they considered all reality to be organised according to reason. But it was
Pythagoras and his disciples, as we have mentioned before, who realised for the first
time that the rationality of the Whole was in fact a kind of harmony, alike to musical
harmony and to mathematical harmony. The ideological trend of thought underlying
Lorenzo's images in The Merchant of Venice and Dorotea's opinions in Don Quijote
origínate from this school: both show that in the Post-classical Europe it was not
necessary to be strictly Pythagorean in order to accept the link established by
Pythagoras between the rational harmony of the world and the rational harmony of
musical notes. In this sense, one can affirm that during two thousand years a
Pythagorean atmosphere penetrated Western culture. Musical harmony would be
considered interesting from the educational point of view as long as that Pythagorean
atmosphere, according to which reality was equally harmonious, would last.
21
 See Brunschvicg (1937), on Pythagorism as one of the axes of European culture unt i l the 17th century. And
even in the 20th century, we can appreciate how that Pythagorean ambience survived in one of the most
interesting Latin-American thinkers, José Vasconcelos (1921), as well as in the Italian philosopher Enrico
Caporali (1914, 1915, 1916). In both, Pythagorism keeps on feeding the basis of their respective
philosophies. More recently, this pre-modern Pythagorean trend is only present in thought imported from the
East (Krishnainacharya, 1999), a fact that seems hardly surprising, since the ideas about music in other
cultures have generally been more similar to pre-modern rather than to modern ideas (Watts, 1962, 193;
Bébey, 1969; Guettat, 1996). In some cases, as in China (Sachs, 1943, 112), they have taken it even a little
further, not only makíng human music depend on the music of the cosmos, bul also vice versa, considering
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In fact, music gained a great deal from the fact that it was suddenly iinked to
rationality, given that rationality had turned out to be the touchstone (instead of religión,
tradition or political authority) in order to understand the world, humankind and the
gods as a Whole. Before the 6th century BC, the role of musicians simply consisted of
entertaíning people during the celebration of ludic or litúrgica! events and, therefore,
learning music was the same as learning a common craft. But, from that century
onwards, the great change occurred, and musicians assumed a new social role, that of
educators: they began to teach not only the future virtuosos, but also all the other
students, independently of their future profession, and music was fmally recognised as
one of the offícial compulsory subjects within their syllabi. It can be held, thus, that
the philosophers' craving for understanding reality in a rational way, which was
¡nfluenced by the Pythagorean idea that such a craving was not so different from that of
musicians, had a beneficial side-effect on Greek musicians. With the spread of
philosophy, music, in symbiosis, achieved the relevant position that it would maintain
throuehout the pre-modern period of our civilisation. The metaphysics of philosophers
23favoured a metaphysics of harmony, and favoured music.
Nowadays we can discrimínate two types of harmony within that solé harmony
which constituted a unitary educational project for the Pythagorean Greeks - a project
that does not lack 'magnificence', as Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1987, 491) put it,
given the variegated array of Ítems it tries to conjoin. We distinguish, on the one hand.
the order (or the disorder) of the cosmos as something dependent on the music played (either in an adequate
or ¡nadequate way) by humans.
22
 For further details on the transformatíon suffered by the role of music in the education of Greeks, see
Robertson and Stevens (1972, 152-153) and Marrou (1948), or the justification provided by the Pseudo
Plutarch (De música, XLIII) back in the 3rd century AD. Curiously enough, the Greek term mousiké
('music') carne to desígnate 'higher education', 'culture', 'science' and 'spiritual training' par excellencc
(Pabón and Echauri, 1963, 343; see also Pindare's Olympian, I, 15), and therefore, mousikós was used to
refer both to musicians and to educated men in general (as attested in Aristophanes' Vespae, 1244).
23
 In this regard, Pythagorean ideas had to come to grips with a radically divergent view, which held initially a
much more widespread scope in pre-Socratic Greece. This contrary outlook Iinked music with the dark,
magical and irrational powers (Dodds, 1999, 83-85), as can be seen in the myth of Orpheus and, most of all,
in the myth of Dionysos. Both mythical characters were opposed to Apollo and his 'rationalising' lyre.
According to the Pythagorean - rationalising view (as repeatedly attested in De música, by the Pseudo
Plutarch, or in Plato's Republic, 399e; and Plato's Symposium, 215a—216a), Apollo managed to defeat them,
much to Nietzsche's (1872) annoyance centuries later.
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the harmony of nature and its laws, and on the other hand, the harmony that governs the
inner self of human beings - cali it mind, heart, spirit, soul or psyche. It should be
noticed that for the Greeks, however, such 'magnificence' was not detectable, because
the modern belief that there is a radical disparity between natural objects, on the one
hand, and human issues on the other, was alien to them: it was utterly normal for them
to believe in the harmony between natural objects and human issues together, which
they deemed as fundamentally analogous matters. Henee, from our perspective, their
attempt can be analysed into:
A) An educational component concerning physical and natural objects that teaches
how the outer world works, and whose role equals that of Natural Sciences nowadays.
In spite of being the main representative of the meagre opposition to the Pythagorean
view that prevailed for centuries, it is Aristotle who best describes how the concept of
harmony in synthesis with the concept of Nature carne to fbrm part of European
imagery:
"The so-called Pythagoreans, who were the first to take up mathematics, not only
advanced this study, but also, having been brought up in it, they thought its principies
were the principies of all things. Since of these principies numbers are by nature the first,
and in numbers they seemed to see many resemblances to the things that exist and come
into being [...]; since, again, they saw that the modifications and the ratios of the musical
scales were expressible in numbers; since, then, all other things seemed in their whole
nature to be modelled on numbers, and numbers seemed to be the first things in the whole
of nature, they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things, and the
whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number. And all the properties of numbers and
scales which they could show to agree with the attributes and parts and the whole
arrangement of the heavens, they collected and fitted into their scheme; and if there was a
gap anywhere, they readily made additions so as to make their whole theory coherent."
(Metaphysics, A 5, 985b 23-986a 5)24
Here we have the very same view that, associating the harmony of mathematics with
that of the universe, and these two kinds of harmony with the purely musical one, would
last until Galileo's well-known metaphor, which described Nature as "the book of God
written in numeríc characters" (a metaphor that, like those by Striggio or Lorenzo, was
not considered 'excessívely metaphoric'). Moreover, Galileo reached the scientific
conclusions that made him notorious from this standpoint. This is the way of thinking
that propitiated the inclusión of music ín the medieval Quadrivium as a compulsory
' See Figure 1.
I 57
Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz
subject, and whose expression "can be found on countless occasions throughout the
Middle Ages" (Fubini, 1990, 101). To sum up, this is the trend of thought that made
Saint Augustine (in his De música. I) condemn those who see in music nothing but a
mere pleasure of the senses instead of a rational science; and this is the approach
adopted by Boethius in his treaty De institutione música, the most influential work of
the Middle Ages. If it is true that at that time "Pythagorean ideas and the new Christian
religiousness blended together almost completely" (Fubini, 1990, 96), then, the belief
that "nothing on heaven and earth [...] can remain outside this discipline [music]"
(Cassiodorus, ¡nstituíiones divinarum et saecularium litterarum, V) could not but hold
an enormous success. Nevertheless, music was not only the most genuine password to
the natural world, since, educating young Europeans in the art of sounds implied as
well:
B) A second instructional component, both psychological and moral, that teaches
how the human inner self works. This factor corresponds roughly to what we cali
Human-Social Sciences and Ethics nowadays. It was the reflection of the harmony
governing Nature's big macrocosm on both the individual's small microcosm and the
State's intermedíate mesocosm. F. M. Cornford (1950, 18-21) has provided one of the
most vivid explanations of such mentality:
"If the power of music is felt by all living things, [...] there must be in the principie of life
itself, in the soul of man and of universal nature, chords that can answer to the touch of
harmonious sound. May it not be the most essential truth about the soul that it is, in some
sort, an instrument of music? [...] Health - the virtue of the body - was interpreted as a
proportion or equipoise of contending elements, which any excess might derange or
fínally destroy. And virtue - the health of the soul - likewise lay in the golden mean,
imposing measure on the turbulence of passion, a temperance which excludes both excess
and deficiency. [...] That the soul should be harmonised meant not only that its several
parts should be in tune with one another, but, as one instrument in an orchestra must be in
tune with all the rest, so the soul must reproduce the harmonía of the Cosmos. [...] The
harmony of heaven is perfect; but its counterpart in human souls is marred with
See chapter II. Boethius, with his puré Pythagorism, plays a decisive role because his work "will be a
compendium of almost everything men knew about such issues during the Middle Ages" (Gilson, 1965,
141). See Figures 2 and 3.
26
 In the third of his Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX, St. Isidore of Seville mentions this assumptíon of
Christian mentality in Europe once more: "Without music no discipline can be perfect, because nothing can
exist without music. It is said that the universe is put together by certain harmonious sounds, and that heaven
itself keeps revolving thanks to certain harmonious modulations" (Gerbert, 1963, 20).
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imperfection and discord. This is what we cali vice or evil. The attainment of that purity
which is to reléase the soul at last [...], may now be constructed as that reproduction, in
the individual, of the cosmic harmony - the divine order of the world. Herein lies the
secret of the power of music over the soul."
This is a long quotation, but it may provide an idea of the peculiar way in which
Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Medicine intertwined with natural-scientific disciplines
such as Astronomy or Physics during the pre-modern phase, thanks to the harmonising
role of music: a mixture which lasted without major problems until the times of
Lorenzo and Dorotea.
This approach had long been preparing the way for the sensible Greeks to leave the
education of their sons, a delicate matter indeed, in the hands of musicians. Many
stories or legends, half parables and half simple anecdotes, soon entered the Hellenic
tradition and convinced the Greeks of the privileged power of music over individuáis, of
its ability to domínate both their will and feelings, directing them towards the most
adequate ends. Thus, for instance, a quite successful story about Terpander spread: this
zíther player was said to have crushed a rebellion in Sparta, simply by singing and
playing his instrument (Mikoletzky, 1966, 262). There was an even more picturesque
history about Damon of Oa, a Pythagorean from the 5th century: According to
Phiiodemos of Gadara and Aristoxenus, a few drunken young men encouraged by the
music of a flute tried to break into the house of a honourable woman (let us not forget
that the flute was considered the most Dionysian instrument ever since Marsyas, the
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satyr, used it to defy Apollo, whose attribute was the lyre ). But Damon, who was
passing nearby, heard the fuss and stopped them from carrying out their deed by asking
the flute player to interpret a Phrygian melody (which was a serious, solemn tune played
during ritual libations). Thus, the young men, moved by the sublime respect that the
music inspired in their hearts, gave up their lusty intentions and withdrew sober
(Lasserre, 1954, 11).
During what we have called the pre-modern stage, all these narratives, and some
29
others that the Christian tradition itself furnished, supported the idea that music was
7
 See his speech in footnote 18.
8
 See footnote 23, Herodotus' History VII, 26, 3, and Aristotle's opinions in Politics, 1341a 17-!341b 9.
9
 Like the story by St. Isidore of Seville (Gerbert, 1963, 20), where he alludes to how David liberated Saúl of
'the evil spirit' with the solé help of his melodics. St. Isidore follows I Sm 16, 14-23. But if we notice that,
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the key to (and the bridle of) students' morality and passions. Such a high concept of
music led Plato to devote many of his pedagogical essays to the analysis of the effects
of musical harmony on the harmony ofthe soul.30 It also propitiated the popularity in
Pedagogy of Damon of Oa, who was reputed for having contributed to the fact that
music was officially recognised as an educator of customs.
This pedagogical attitude lasted for a long time. As late as in the Musicology ofthe
15th century, we can find a good example of how little important musical instruction
became for the simple education of future musicians, and, on the contrary, how deeply
relevant it was deemed for the education of people in general. Thus, when Johannes
Tinctoris, a Flemish scholar, Usted the effects of music on individuáis in his work
Complexus effectuum musices (Coussemaker, 1963, IV, 193), he mentioned twenty
effects, most of which affect the religious faculties of the individual "Ecclesiam
militantem triumphanti assimilare", "Ad susceptionem benedictiones divinare
praeparare"3', her feelings "Tristitiam depellere", "Duritiam cordis resolvere", or
even her physical faculties "Aegrotos sanare", "Labores temperare". But the most
remarkable fact for our contemporary mentality is that only one of these twenty effects
of music (and it comes out as the penultimate one) has to do with music itself in a direct
34
way: "Peritos in ea glorificare."
However, this status quo did not last forever, and half a century later, most
intellectuals would no longer seriously believe in the main part of the awe-inspiring
effects that Tinctoris had attributed to the muse Euterpe. Pythagorean days in Europe
were at an end.
according to the biblical text, 'the evil spirit' to which he refers was 'sent by God' (1 Sm 16, 15), then it is
reasonable to think that it was not a demon that would affect the soul (a righteous God could have never sent
him), but rather a disease of the body. Thus, in fact, this anecdote would point out the medical benefits of
music, rather than its psychological or moral ones (Núñez, 1992, 361).
!
" See, for instance, Repiiblic 376e, 398c-403c, 410a-412b, 475d-476b, 530d-535a, 591d; Laws, 658-659,
798a, 802; Phaedo, 60e-61b; Timaeus, 35b, 47c-e, 88b...
"Looking l ike the militant, triumphant Church" and "Getting ready to receive God's blessings".
"Pushing sadness away" and "Softening up one's heart".
1
 "Healing the ill" and "Mitigating [our] efforts".
34
 "Praising those who are experts in it (the musicians)".
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FIGURE 1: The Pythagorean astronomical system. We can graphically appreciate
here how Pythagorean Cosmology was a mixture of mathematical, musical and
observational notions. For Pythagoreans, the world was organised in concentric
spheres that were embedded within each other like Russian Matrushka dolls. Each
sphere contained one heavenly body (except for the last sphere, which was bigger and
contained all the fixed stars), and made it move because each sphere revolved around
the others. Thefriction causea by this rotation would produce the harmonic music ofthe
spheres, which configured one of the Pythagoreans most solid beliefs: they believed it
so firmly, that they had to admit the hypothesis of a 'counter-earth'. Indeed, for the
sound ofthe spheres to be harmonic it had to be produced by ten spheres (ten was the
perfect number) and they knew of only nine: the ones which contained the Sun, the
Moon, the Earth, thefive planets that could be seen at that time, and the one ofthe fixed
stars. Thus, they put forward the hypothesis ofthe existence ofa tenth sphere containing
a tenth heavenly body that was equal to the Earth (the 'Counter-Earth'). That heavenly
body would bring about the harmony of the whole or, putting it in a dijferent way,
would make the orchestra sound good. This way, music in Europe became exceedingly
relevant in arder to study the cosmos: it would come in as handy as mathematics or as
the observation of the night sky in order to accept or reject any astronomical
hypothesis, such as the one ofthe 'Counter-Earth'.
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FIGURE 2: Picture of Pythagoras according to a medieval edition of Boethius. This
picture displays iconographically a prized medieval conviction, of Pythagorean origin:
that there is a link between the harmonic order ofHeaven (the bells hanging above) and
earthly order (the scales that Pythagoras is holding in his left hand). But it also
represents the belief that such order was a musical one (the scales contain different
musical Instruments such as the one Pythagoras is using to play the heavenly bells in a
harmonic way).
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FIGURE 3: Drawing representing Boethius and Pythagoras competing in music and
arithmetic (Margaista Philosophica, 1504). This image reflects two bonds that
medieval Europe deemed as natural as heaven 's blue: on the one hand, the link between
arithmetic studies and music, and, on the other hand, the link between the two authors
in the picture. This explains why the determinan! role playea by thefirst one during this
era gave way to the Pythagorean trend that prevailed during the entire Middle Ages.
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2 2. Modernity, Aristotle and Romanticism: Three oda allies against the oíd role of
music in European culture
The pre-modern mentality described before shaped the frame of mind of poets such
as Shakespeare, novel writers such as Cervantes, philosophers such as Plato, doctors
such as Herophilos of Chalcedon,35 musicians such as Gioseffo Zarlino (1558),
educators such as Damon of Oa, scientists such as Galileo, musicologists such as
Tinctoris and saints such as Isidore of Seville. Nevertheless, although it was the
dominant view for approximately two thousand years, it was not at all unanimous. The
leader of the tenacious few who were at cross purposes with such domination is one of
the big ñames of that age: Aristotle, the philosopher.
Aristotle's opinions on the social role of music may seem very natural and sound
nowadays, but at the time, they turned out to be a little too pedestrian or sceptical:
thus, only very few, like some Epicureans and Hedonists, subscribed them (Fubini,
1990, 65-67). For Aristotle, music was a mere 'hobby', another way to amuse oneself
during leisure time (Politics, 1337b, 31-34). Thus, from the point of view of its
educational valué, music should be regarded as inferior to grammar, sciences, trade or
even gymnastics, which at least keeps your body healthy (1338a, 10-24). He had
explicit doubts about the existence of harmony either in heaven (De Cáelo, B 9, 290 b
12) or within the human soul (Politics, 1340b, 17-20; Historia animalium, I 4, 407b
27-29)37 and had serious mísgivings, therefore, about the fact that learning music might
serve to know more about the physical or the psychological worlds: Thus, musical arts
must be taught only to those who were going to become professional musicians (134Ib,
9-16), or to those who were going to judge the quality of the music played by these
very professionals (1340b, 35^10). As a result, for Aristotle music was not an
indispensable element within education (1338a, 15), and all that may remain of it is a
straightforward way to provide individuáis with aesthetic pleasure in their free time:
35
 See McDaniel and Hammond (1997), on the strange way in which this man from Alexandria mixed up
medicine and music, having powerful later influences in Calen. Yet, the idea of harmony was essential for
medicine at least since the appearance of the anonymous work On Diet 1, 8: 9; 18.
"' A radical (and wcll sustained) alternative to the reading of Aristotle rendered here is the one providcd by
dilate (1989); we cannot, however, enter here a proper discussion of it.
" Lucretius denies such theory in a much more explicit way in his work De rerum natura, I I I , 94-135.
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Why do those who suffer and those who rejoice resort to the music of the aulos
[a double flute]? It is evident that in the first case, they resort to it in order to soothe
their pain, and ¡n the second case, they resort to it in order to rejoice even more
(Problemata Physica, XIX, I).38
Aristotle's aestheticism had some bearing on authors such as Aristoxenus or the
Epicurean Philodemos. However, such notions did not put ¡n danger the pre-modern
high esteem of music as something more than a mere amusement, until Cartesian
theories expanded throughout Europe. Curiously enough, Cartesian theories were,
however, considered deeply anti-Aristotelian in almost all other áreas of culture.
Rene Descartes opened a new period in Western mentality, a period that was
altogether different from that described in the previous paragraphs: he marked the start
of the modern world. It is common to define the features of this modern world by
comparing them with those of a unitary world harmonically organised according to the
musicality defended by Pythagorean emulators: From Descartes onwards, reality would
no longer be a unity between nature and human beings; instead, there would emerge a
sheer divergence between:
1) The so-called res extensa, or whatever the fashionable sciences of the time could
analyse from a mathematical perspective. That is to say, the natural world or material
space studied by physics, geometry and astronomy, all of them sciences which were
progressing extraordinarily and exerting more and more control over their respective
fields.
2) The different realities that fall outside the boundaries of the aforementioned
sciences, and that human beings cannot control by means of these very sciences. These
realities include most of the things that happen in interiore homine (within human
beings), and that can only be accessed through individual introspection and
philosophical reasoning. This second world is known as res cogítans.
These are two veritably different worlds, and not just two different parts of the
world, since, during the modern era, trying to overeóme the distance between both
spheres is just as strenuous as if they were two different universes. From the
38
 It must be said that the fact that Aristotle is attributed the authorship of this text and of the previously
mentioned work, Historia animalium, is not fully reliable; at all events, it must have been highly influenced
by the ideas that he sustained (Ryan and Schmitt, 1982).
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ontological, the epistemological and axiological points of view, the principies that rule
Nature have nothing to do with those that govern Human Essence, and vice versa. Such
dualism soon gives way to an increasing pluralism: specific laws are attributed to each
plañe of nature, which is studied now by a specific science (e.g., biology, chemistry,
physics...); and the same crops up in the different planes of human essence (e.g.,
psychology, economics, art, sociology ...). Reality was progressively converted ínto a
set of diverse unconnected áreas.
All these features of the pluralistic modern world are very well known to everyone;
descriptions of them have been provided in all shapes and sizes, from Max Weber or
Paul Valéry, to H. Blumenberg or Ortega y Gasset. However, there is something which
is not so well known: the fact that the dominating role that music had acquired during
the unitary, pre-modern age was so alien to this new modern shape of mind, that it
began to be questioned by the very same leaders of Modernity themselves since the
very beginníng of their careers - and since the beginning of Modernity. Could harmony
still be an essential concept in education once the European spirit had been convinced
that harmony did no longer preside over reality? Could it still be a fundamental concept
in education after the discordant split between the Natural world and the Human world,
and between these two and the Divinity? (Theology could less and less explain the
organisation of the natural world, or human matters.) The answer to these two questions
ís a fíat denial, as issued by Descartes himself (1650,1, 4-13):
"Musicae finís, ut delectet, variosque ín nobis moveat affectus. Fíeri autem possunt
cantilenae simul tristes & delectabiles, nec mirum tam diversae [...]. Nam de ipsius soni
qualitate, ex quo corpore & quo pacto gratíor exeat, agant Physíci."39
Thus, at the very opening of his Compendium musicae, a work entirely devoted to
music and probably written by 1617, before the renowned Discours de la méthode, the
herald of the modern view of the world states that the solé aim of music ¡s 'to amuse'
('delectef), along the line that the isolated trend of Aristotle and his Hedonist or
Epicurean followers had been pointing out for centuries. Music does not serve to
understand the natural world any longer; and, besides, in order to understand music
itself, the reasons why it pleases us, or how sound is generated, it will be necessary to
' "The aim of music is to amuse us and to make us experience different feelings. The chords can be sad and
delightful at the same time and that without being different from each other, which is even more amazing
[...]. Physicians are responsible for studying the nature of sound, the object that generales ¡t and the
conditions under which it concords."
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resort to the newcomer science that now does accomplish the explanation of the natural
world: physics ('agant Physici'). The different systems that spread throughout Europe
from the 17th century onwards do not explain Nature by means of music or harmony,
but by means of laws such as 'F=m-a'. The universe is not organised according to
totalitarian, harmonic principies, but according to a set of successive and individual
causes and effects. The world is no longer a magnificent symphony, but a large heavy
machine, and things are not in harmony with each other; instead, they are simply set
into motion by crashing into each other. There is neither a shared identity, ñor a mutual
belonging between Nature and the Human Being, whose relationship consists of a series
of mechanical causes and effects between them (Lang, 1941, 711, 1020). In addition,
music is not what explains things any longer: it is what is explained. Thus, the
Pythagorean postúlate recorded by Cornford about an 'inner instrument of music' will
no longer be used in order to explain the influence of music on human sensibility: it will
be no longer believed that an inner orderliness recognizes and orders itself in
accordance with the exterior instrumental one. The effects of music on human feelings
will enter the list of unconscious causes and effects that take place in the world: music
brings about events but does not alústrate the events that occur in the world or in
human beings. Music is, as a result, only another cog in the modern world's great,
impersonal machine. A little cog which sometimes provokes certain sensorial events (such
as accelerating the heart's rhythm, relaxing the muscles, or even crying in the case of
sentimental individuáis), and which is affected by certain physical events (such as plucking a
string, setting the vocal chords into motion, or hitting certain objects). That is all.
This new concept of music, which by and by affected European mentality, confined
music to the educational role that Aristotle longed for, and is the image of music shared
even now by teachers such as Rosa Q. Ñ. Music turns into a matter which is only
interesting for those who want to produce or savour it; as it progressively ensues, by the
way, with everything else within the capitalist system - as a matter of fact, the
impersonal, mechanistic modern image of the world wil l precisely provide the adequate
" The theory about the affections provoked by music in human psychology, known as Affektenlehre, became
rclevant from the moment when this causal approach to music appeared. (According to the mechanicism that
we are describing, and not just to make a pun, this theory about 'Affekterí could also be called a theory
about 'Effekterí or 'effects'.) Henee, it is not a simple quirk that Athanasius Kircher (1650) issued the work
that initiated such a mechanistic kind of approach to music in the very same year that the Cartesian
Compendium Musicae was finally published. See the article by Alina Madry included in the present book, as
well as Chierotti (1999).
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conditions for capitalism to develop (Bell, 1974, 477). Of course, there were some timid
opponents to this new hegemonic ideology, but their very failure contributed to reaffirm
the position of those who supported the modern view that music and the study of the
natural world should go separately. One of these opponents, Johannes Kepler, a
contemporary of Descartes, carried out the last serious, meticulous attempt to put
forward a scientific physical theory of the universe according to laws of music.
Significantly enough, his 1619 treatise, the one where he presented his well-known third
law4' was entitled Harmonices Mundi. However, this title already sounded far too
optimistic. In fact, Kepler had had to abandon his fírst efforts intended to organíse, from
a mathematical perspective, the observations of Tycho Brahe in a purely Pythagorean
style; efforts which consisted of mixing certain features of the five regular polyhedrons
with musical notions and Brahe's measurements, and efforts whose origin lay only in
the apparent coincidences of both fields of study, which casually struck him as he carne
to research about the planets. It was not until he abandoned such hypotheses that he42
carne up with his three laws on the movement of the planets around the sun.
Something similar happened to another opponent of Cartesian theories, G. W.
Leibniz. He defíned music as "exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare
43animf (Leibniz, 1712, 132), trying to convince Western minds that the structure of
music was really the same as that of mathematics, nature and the soul. According to
him, when a soul enjoyed music, it was not self-aware in a Cartesian rationalistic sense
("nescentis se animf'), yet it could notice the arithmetic relation ("arithmeticae")
between the music it perceived and the Whole, its harmony with the Whole, and feel
moved hereby in a very distinctive way ('''exercitium"). In fact, for Leibniz, the Whole
was still something harmonious, with a harmony that had been pre-established for the
41
 It states that the ratio of the cube of the semimajor axis of the ellipse (i.e., the average distance of the planet
from the sun) to the square of the planet's period (the time it needs to complete one revolution around the
sun) is the same for all the planets.
42
 See Figures 4, 5 and 6.
43
 "Hidden exercise in arithmetic carried out by the soul, which cannot calcúlate itself, or, to quote the
translation provided by J i f í Fukai in his contribution to the present book, "unconscious computing of the
mind".
44
 See Valverde (2000, 131). Jan Amos Komensky, also known as Comenius (1668), follows this line of
thinking with his idea ofpanharmonia, but he, like Leibniz, entered the European spirít too late, when ¡t was
becoming almost completely modern.
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whole creation: Was it not the most plausible to think that a perfect Creator should have
created the best world possible, harmoniously interconnected and in tune?
Yet, Leibiniz's project to créate a science for the study of the sweet harmony
between the basic components (the 'monads') of both the natural and the human
universes did not triumph over the cold Cartesian mechanicism (neither over the
Newtonian one). Ñor could Kepler deny the fact that his final elaborations of the cosmic
laws no longer bore any relation to music. Therefore, the new dominant modern mentality
could gently settle ¡n the Weltanschauung of Europeans for generations, with only but a
few exceptions, as had been previously the case of the pre-modem view. Of course, this
did not mean that all modern men shared exactly the same opinión about music. It merely
meant that, despite the differences, they all agreed that music did not reflect the existence of
any previous harmony, be it physical or psychological (let alone any physical-psychological
or physical-psychological-divine ones, as before the 17th century).
Thus, for instance, the philosophers J. J. Rousseau, J. D'Alembert and I. Kant represen!,
at fírst glance, three opinions at odds over the relevance of music. For Rousseau, music is
highly valuable since it brings the individual back to the mythical state of the primitive man,
a happy time when the human race could live unaware of all the complications entailed in
modern civilisation; at that time, speech was more a mixture of words and melody,
combining sense and sensibility, logical argumentation with feelings: speaking was like
singing (Rousseau, 1781, XII). For D'Alembert, however, the reason why music is
valuable is not that it can express feelings in the same way as back in those happy days,
but that it can express human interiority in a more adequate way each time, progressing
throughout history just like any other science (D'Alembert, 1752). Kant, on the
contrary, places music in the lowest position with respect to the other Fine Arts.
"Wenn man dagegen den Wert der schonen Künste nach der Kultur schátzt, die sie dem
Gemüt verschaffen, und die Erweiterung der Vermógen, welche in der Urteilskraft zum
Erkenntnisse zusammenkommen müssen, zum MaBstabe nimmt; so hat Musik unter den
45
 For example: Y. M. André, who claimed that "the human body had an absolutely harmonious structure"
(1741, 81), and J. P. Rameau (1722), who wrote the fírst relevant treatise about harmony in Europe before
starting his remarkably productive musical career, and then "found himself all alone before the world, when
he was oíd" (Fubini, 1990, 203). See also other more recent cases mentioned in footnote 21.
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schónen Künsten sofern den untersten
(Kant, 1790, §53)46
| Platz, weil sie bloB mit Empfmdungen spielt."
And yet, Rousseau's appreciation of music because of its primitive facet,
D'Alembert's respect for its historical progress, and Kant's hardly dissembled contempt
for the art of sounds, all sprang from the same ideológica! presuppositions: that music
no longer transmits knowledge because there is no similar harmony within man or
nature, and therefore, music is only of valué to express the irrational part of individuáis,
that which cannot be conceptualised in knowledge. This is the part that the myths of
Orpheus and Dionysus had vindicated before the success of Pythagorean postúlales.
This is the part in which Aristotle placed music, which only served to amuse us in
leisure time. The part that Rousseau longed for, D'Alembert wanted to improve
progressively and Kant undervalued. The part praised by Romanticism, the most
important cultural movement at the beginning of the 19th century, which is dealt with in
the next section, given the fact that it played the last relevant role in pinning down the
modern musical ideas which we are describing.
6
 "If, on the other hand, we estímate the worth of the fine arts by the culture they supply to the mind, and
adopt for our standard the expansión of the faculties whose confluence, in judgement, is necessary for
cognition, music, then, has the lowest [...] place among the fine arts, since it plays merely with sensations."
The Hule appreciation that Professor Kant felt for music is explicitly expressed in the unexpected comments
that he makes in this same paragraph, where he also shows a hardly dissembled disgust, which might seem
somewhat quaint to us nowadays: "Over and above all this, music has a certain lack of urbanity about it. For
owing chiefly to the character of its instruments, it scatters its ¡nfluence abroad to an uncalled-for extent
(through the neighbourhood), and thus, as it were, becomes obtrusive and deprives others, outside the
musical circle, of their freedom. This is a thing that the arts that address themselves to the eye do not do, for
if one is not disposed to give admittance to their impressions, one has only to look the other way. [...] Those
who have recommended the singing of hymns at family prayers have forgotten the amount of annoyance
which they give to the general public by such noisy (and, as a rule, for that very reason, pharisaical)
worship, for they compel their neighbours either to join in the singing or else abandon their meditations."
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FIGURE 4: The only flve regular polyhedrons. What attracted Kepler's attention was
the fact that onlyfive objects with geometrically equal sides could be created (the ones
in the picture), and the fact that five was precisely the number of planets known at his
time (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Júpiter and Saturn). In a purely Pythagorean style, he
concluded that this could not be due to mere chance, and that such a coincidence
should mean something. His first hypothesis, then, was that each planet occupied a
sphere (just as Greek Pythagoreans thought), although there was a distance between
each sphere (not like in Figure 1, where each sphere touches the immediately bigger
and smaller ones). Following this hypothesis, the distance between every two spheres
would be causea by the insertion of a different regular polyhedron in the mídale of
them: The tetrahedron between the two smaller ones, the cube between the second and
the third smaller ones, and so on. Thus, it would be possible to work out the distance
between planets (between spheres), which was one of the calculi Kepler was looking
for. The modelfor this hypothetical astronomic system appears next, in Figure 5.
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FIGURE 5: Kepler's model of embedded spheres between the nesting of the five
regular solids. This figure reproduces the way Kepler imagined the organisation of the
solar systetn when he initiated his research (Mysterium Cosmographicum, 1596): each
concentric sphere between two polyhedrons would contain one of the five planets known
at the time. He asked for funding from the Duke of Wurttemburg in order to continué
studying this subject and to build a model like this one using jewels and precious
metáis. However, the Duke did not consider it such a good idea, and refused to support
it. However, Kepler 's main problem was not a fínancial one, but, rather, the fací that
subsequent calculations made him realise that his previous image of 'spheres within
polyhedrons' did not correspond to what existed in the sky (according to the
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observations of Tycho Brahe). Therefore, he ended up by having to dismiss his initial
Pythagorean idea of the five planets corresponding to the five polyhedrons. As a matter
offact, soon after he discovered his well-known three laws, which were a shock to the
European visión ofthe world and a death blow to Pythagorism itself, since they provea
that the movement ofthe planets was not circular but elliptical (therefore, there were no
'perfect' spheres). However, his nostalgia for the Pythagorean view he had contributed
to demolish was the reason why he decided to entitle the book he published in 1619
Harmonices Mundi: even though, in the world (mw\Á\) there described, there was no
trace anymore ofthis 'harmony' (harmonices) presumed by Pythagoras.
MAR tó©M c i s L i B, « 207
|nn»t(infiiiitiicpoce«M )p<rmc*nwjtfly : id quod alirer A me non
ooruíc exprimí. qutra per continuam ícncni Nutamim iutcrmcdia-
VcniM Mercuriut Hiclocum habec ctiaroj
FIGURE 6: Kepler's alleged specific seríes of iones for each planet. According to
the recalcitrant Pythagorean Kepler, the velocities of the planets and their orbits
are related to specific musical scales. He even thought to have discovered them: this
is the way the sky sounds. Or, at least, the way it used to sound.
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2.3 Schopenhauer, our Educator
During the Romantic period in Europe, the opposition between man and world,
between soul and Nature, was at its highest, and manifested the greatest inscrutable gap
ever existing between them, just as Kant had foreseen in his Third Antinomy (1781b). In
the Western mind, the natural world had progressively been reckoned as the realm of
those creatures which are mechanically determined by mathematical, Newtonian laws,
especially since the Marquis Laplace (1799-1825) found an answer to the remaining
questions posed by Sir Isaac in his project to explain the entire universe. And,
complementarily, after the French Revolution, the human world had increasingly
become the realm oífreedom, a sphere full of undetermined elements (human beings),
of creatures that can and want to buíld their own future both individually, from their
particular ethical valúes (Kantian self-determination: Kant, 1788), and collectívely, as a
nation, by means of Politics (Kantian-Fichtean self-determination: Kedourie, 1960).
These two realms, the absolutely determined one, slave to physical laws, and the
absolutely undetermined one, free and liberating, had to be studied, therefore, following
two radically dissimilar approaches. Thus, Natural Sciences, inspired in Newton, would
only study the natural world, the world of objects, and the so-called
Geisieswissenschaften or Humaniora - Humanities - would study human beings, their
free inner self, the individual subject (Gadamer, 1960,1,1, 1).
Nevertheless, the rupture between these two realms could not be lived without an
utter scandal for the most valuable European minds: how could the world be divided
into two so different things: men on the one hand, and, on the other, all the rest? As a
consequence, the Romantic era turned out to be an epoch in which the most (and last)
highly elaborated conceptual constructs were developed, in order to try to unify what no
one considered unitary any more: the unified world view that everyone considered
almost impossible to restore. This was the aim of huge conceptual constructs such as the
ambitious philosophies of Germán Dialectics pul forward by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel
and Marx. Bruno Latour was not completely off-centred when he defined their thinking
47
as "philosophies that intend to cover up the new growíng gap" (Latour, 1993, 88).
Yet, that world where the sphere of natural objects and the sphere of human beings
7
 They intend to cover it up, but (hey fail to do so (Latour, 1993, 90). See also Sacristán's analysis on Hegel
and about how he could not prevent this Zersetztm¡> of the modern world from taking place.
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coexisted in harmony was already a lost world: it was the pre-modern world, and no
cunning attempts to recover it appealed any more to hardly anyone.
Given this situation, music grew to be increasingly restricted to those undersized
educational spheres that were exclusively devoted to musical purposes. Nevertheless,
we must acknowledge, ío be sure, that Romanticism carried out one last attempt to place
art in general, and music in particular, in a relevant position within the lives of
Europeans at the beginning of the 19th century, by coining the notion of 'artistic genius'
(Gadamer, 1960, I, I, 2, 2). The 'genius' and his artistic production were claimed to
epitomize the secret way to access the most intímate ingredient of reality, and they were
deemed even more powerful man reason or the sciences. Art could reveal the real
essence of the world. It was in this context that, after listening to Johann Sebastian
Bach's compositions, Goethe wrote a letter to Zelter on the 21st of June 1827, affirming
that they represented "God's inner harmony before the creation of the Universe".
But in fact, no scientist (not even Goethe), no engineer or politician would seriously
charge artists with the task of studying that very Universe, and even less would they
provide the artist with the resources or the money to achieve such objectives (Sacristán,
1967). Thus, eventually, art and music had to contení themselves with occupying a
privileged position to access one of the halves of Modernity, the domain of subjectivity
and undetermined freedom within human beings, but not the other longed-for half, that
is, the domain that comprises the rest of the universe. In this manner, artistic pedagogy
had to specialise, no longer providing "a [general] education through art, but turning
into solely an [artistic] education for art" (Gadamer, 1960, I, I, 3, 1). In spite of
Romanticism's keen endeavour to increase the appreciation of art and music, both art
and music were pushed away to a highly praised position, indeed, but a position so
radically detached from the physical world and real life as strictly focussed on
subjectivity and the artistic tiny moments that the modern world let us go through.
Therefore, the musical education that was earnestly welcome by Western intellectuals
had nothing to do with the remaining áreas of education any more. "It was this way how
8
 "Germán Romanticism considered it [music] the universal language of mankind" (Gadamer, 1972a). In this
vein, we can recall how F. W. J. Schelling revitalised certain drifts of the previous Pythagorean mentality
(Pareyson, 1964, 145-152). We might also evoke how Hegel bailed music out, rescuing it from the last
position among the Fine Arts, in which Kant had confined it, to place it in the second position, right after
poetry (Fubini, 1990,266-271).
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a deep and indissoluble dualism settled" (Gadamer, 1960, I, I, 3, 1) and such dualism
was even deeper and more unbreakable than that of the early Moderns.
Friedrich Schiller's letters, published in his Über die asthetische Erziehung des
Menschen (1795), ¡Ilústrate the process whereby Romantics, paradoxically enough,
commend and ill-treat musical education at the same time, by totally discriminating it
from the kind of instruction which seeks the knowledge of the real world. However, the
best milestone of this pervasive paradox of the European soul was the one produced by
the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer in his Die Welt ais Wille und Vorstellung (1819).
This work includes the three features of Romanticism mentioned before: First, the
natural world (which he labels Vorstellung, the world of representations) is radically
detached from the world of human freedom (which he labels Wille, the human will).
Secondly, there is a plea for music, which is for Schopenhauer the most important
human endeavour, just because it is the only one that permits us to escape from our
concerns in the illusory, fake world of objective representations (Vorstellungen), and
compels us to find out that the true essence of reality rests on the subjective will (Wille).
Finally, Schopenhauer does away with any chances that musical education may have of
becoming of any practical use, in the purest Romantic mood. For him, the supreme
valué of music lies precísely in the fact that it takes us away frorn the natural and social
world, the world that we share with each other, the world of the Vorstellungen. Music is
the most worthwhíle human activity just because it is useless, and the more it detaches
us from the world described by Newton, and the less it links itself to reason and
knowledge, the better music it turns out to be. Music is the most precious thing in the
world because it enables us to escape from the world.
Schopenhauer proposed a bizarre metaphysics, where the only real thing was an
anonymous Will, outside the world, which was what supposcdly created the cognitive
representations stated by Science. It can be avowed that he was not a too successí'ul
metaphysician, as attested by the fact that, after him, his conception of the world did not
reach a minimal standing - there are even some who suspect that he did not believe in
such a conception himself (Valverde, 2000, 211). Bul the rest of his message became
very well known: music has nothing to do with the knowledge of the world, thus,
musical education is only useful for music, and the aesthetical world of music is
differenl from the real world. These ideas, as is usual in many other works by
Schopenhauer, define the modern world so accurately that many of his texts seem to
have a certain air of
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"'ovvietá' che prova oggi il lettore di Schopenhauer; una ovvietá niente affatto
svalutativa: Schopenhauer non ci dice cose banali, ma cose che ci paiono chiare perché ci
sembra di saperle gia; come si dice, ci riconosciamo in esse." (Vattimo, 1982, 61)
This is how Schopenhauer has come to be our real 'educator' nowadays (Vattimo,
1982, 61; 1989a), taking upon himself the role that music used to play. He, as a teacher,
has taught us to confine music to an aesthetical world apart, a world where learning
about music is relevant only for this very aesthetical world of music. For the other, for
the real world, music at its best is of worth only ín order to ful it in with some colour
(Marquard, 1989). Schopenhauer as a teacher has been so thriving that the spreading of
his creed has grown to be the kind of 'obviousness' that Rosa Q. Ñ. (as well as rnany
other contemporary, though unaware, disciples of Schopenhauer) admitted at the
beginning of this article.
The first one to make us realise the importance of Schopenhauer as educator of the
modern world was another philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, who reflected this in his
essay of 1874 Schopenhauer ais Erzieher ('Schopenhauer as educator'). According to
this work, we can understand present-day mentality through Schopenhauer, especially
in order to learn how to criticise it in an adequate way:
"namlich zu erkláren, wie wir Alie durch Schopenhauer uns gegen unsre Zeit erziehen
konnen - weil wir den Vortheil haben, durch ihn diese Zeit wirklich zu kennen."
(Nietzsche, 1874b, IV)50
With his usual clairvoyance, Nietzsche found out that Schopenhauer had proposed
the only viable alternative to the four functions that education was to have by the end of
the second millennium. We alrcady know Schopenhauer's alternative, which consists of
tcaching something useless, such as music, in order to forget our daily worries and to
enter an altogether different world where we can be more subjective and free, and at the
same time less scienlific and less rational. This fifth function of education, which might
be called 'aesthetic', 'subjective' or 'escapist', has been among the functions of
Western instructional systems from the Romantic age onwards, and thus music is still
one of the optional subjects in the secondary school where Rosa Q. Ñ. works. The other
'' 'Obviousness', which is savoured by those who read Schopenhauer loday; but in (his case, 'obvious' is not
used to express contempt: Schopenhauer is not saying banalities, but Ihings which seem clear to us just
because it looks as if we already knew them; as some say, we can recognise ourselves in them,"
"Namely, to explain how we al! can be educated through Schopenhauer agaínst our time, since we are
fortúnate in so far as we can really get to know our time through him."
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four functions of education were considered by Nietzsche as contrary to Schopenhauer's
functíon, but (and this was not forecasted by Nietzsche, who thought them to be wholly
incompatible) presently coexist peacefully in our schools with this fifth, supposedly
contrary, one. They are stated next:
1) Education as coaching in the bourgeois business and economic capitalíst
51
system , or in
"Die Selbstsucht der Erwerbenden [...]. Von dieser Seite kommt jener beliebte Satz und
Kettenschluss her, der urigefahr so lautet: mó'glichst viel Erkenntniss und Bildung, daher
móglichst viel Bedürfniss, daher moglichst viel Produktion, daher moglichst viel Gewinn
und Glück - so klingt die verführerische Forme!. Bildung würde von den Anhangern
derselben ais die Einsicht definirt werden, mit der man, in Bedürfnissen und deren
Befriedigung, durch und duren zeitgemáss wird, mit der man aber zugleich am besten
über alie Mittel und Wege gebietet, um so leicht wie móglich Geld zu gewinnen."
(Nietzsche, 1874b. VI)52
2) Education as nationalist indoctrination in order to favour
"[der] Seibstsucht des Staates [...]. Vorausgesetzt, dass er sich stark genug weiss, um nicht
nur entfésseln, sondern zur rechten Zeit in's Joch spannen zu konnen, [...] so kommt die
Ausbreitung der Bildung unter seinen Bürgern immer nur ihm selbst, im Wetteifer mit
andern Staaten zu Cute. Überall, wo man jetzt vom 'Kulturstaat' redet, síeht man ihm die
Aufgabe gestellt, die geistigen Kráfte einer Generation so weit zu entbinden, dass sie
damií den bestehenden Institutionen dienen und nützen konnen: aber auch nur soweit."
(Nietzsche, 1874b, VI)53
51
 As Vattimo (1985a, 32) has observed, Nietzsche's criticism about this functíon, and his assessment of the
one that we will discuss in the fourth place, derive from the influence of Jacob Burckhardt (1905).
" "The selfishness of business men [...]. They have created the well-liked principie or chain reasoning that
goes as follows: let us search for as much knowledge and instruction as possible and therefore, as many
necessities as possible and therefore, as much production as possible and therefore, as much profit and
happiness as possible - this is what this tempting formula states. Those in charge of spreading education
would define it as the ability to discern Ihings whereby we become more similar to our contemporaries, bolh
with regards to our necessities and to the way we satisfy them; the ability thanks to which we have all the
different ways and means in order to earn money in the easiest way."
"The selfishness of the State [...]. Provided that it deems itself strong enough not only to set free, but also to
subjugate people under its yoke if the time comes, [...] thus the spread of education among its citizens will
finally enhance the affairs of this State in relation ío other States. Nowadays, those places where they talk
about the 'State of culture' prove that the State has been assigned the task of liberating the spiritual forces of
a nation according to whether such forces can serve and benefit the existing institutions — but only in this
case, and nothing more."
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3) Education as a means of teaching the good manners and civilised customs
necessary for living within society:
"Da wird drittens die Kultur von alien denen gefórdert, welche sich eines hasslichen oder
langweiligen Inhaltes bewusst sind und über ihn durch die sogenannte 'schone Form'
táuschen wollen. Mit dem Áusserlichen, mit Wort, Gebarde, Verzierung, Gepránge,
Manierlichkeit solí der Beschauer zu einem falschen Schlusse über den Inhalt genothigt
werden [...]. Mir scheint es bisweilen, dass die modernen Menschen sich grenzcnlos an
einander langweilcn und dass sie es endlich nóthig finden, sich mit Hülfe aller Künste
interessant zu machen." (Nietzsche, 1874b, VI)54
4) And, finally, education as a way to learn about science and technology, the issues
which allow us to dominate the world by means of objectivist research. Such techno-
scientific instruction does not deal at all with the human interiority, following what he
called
"die Selbstsucht der Wissenschaft [...]. Die Wissenschañ verhá'lt sich zur Weisheit, wie
die Tugendhaftigkeit zur Heiligung: sie ist kalt und trocken, sie hat keine Liebe [...]. Sie
ist sich selber eben so nützlich, ais sie ihren Dienern schadlich ist, insofern sie auf
dieselben ihren eignen Charakter übertragt und damit ihre Menschlichkeit gleichsam
verknochert. So lange unter Kultur wesentlich Fórderung der Wissenschaft verstanden
wird, geht sie an dem grossen leidenden Menschen mit unbarmherziger Kalte vorüber,
weil die Wissenschaft überall nur Probleme der Erkenntniss sieht, und weil das Leiden
eigentlich innerhalb ihrer Welt etwas Ungehoriges und Unverstandliches, also hochstens
wieder ein Problem ist." (Nietzsche, 1874b. VI)55
We have quoted Nietzsche extensively in view of the fact that his considerations,
though regarded by himself as 'ill-timed' or 'unfashionable' (Unzeitgemafle
Betrachtungen) in his days, might proffer today a portrait not so far removed from our
"" "In the third place, culture is promoted by those who regard themselvcs as having an ugly or boring
inwardness, and wish to hide it beneath the so-called 'charming manners'. The observer should be induced
to draw wrong conclusions about that inwardness by means of external appearances, by means of words, of
gestures, refinement, luxury and good breeding [...]. I have from time to time the impression that modern
men bore each other a great deal, and, in the end, they need to make themselves more interesting by means
of all arts."
' "The egotism of science 1...]. Science is to wisdom what morality is to holiness: it is cold and dry, devoid of
all love [...]. As long as science seeks its own benefit, it harms its servants, because it transfers onto them its
own character, fossilising their human features. As long as culture is understood as the promotion of science,
science will pass aloof and unmoved before those men who suffer, because science sees only knowledge
problems everywhere and because, in its world, suffering is inappropriate and incomprehensible, or just one
more problem."
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present-day condition. Besides, they visibly delimit the solé remaining territory, where a
fifth function can take place: the function of artistic disciplines, such as music. When,
right before going away on her summer holidays, Rosa Q. Ñ. tries to make some room
for music within the educational system, she never questions the obligatory presence of
the other four functions of education at secondary schools. She only asks for students to
be given the chance to learn how to escape from life's hurly-burly, from that reality, by
means of all kind of musical compositions. The rest of education already deals with
reality: as do economics56 and foreign languages, which are taught because of their
future potential within the work market57 (first function signalled by Nietzsche). Reality
is also treated by the State58 through the design of instructional programmes that only
study the geography, history, language and literature of its particular country: all that
56
 The pedagógica! movement called 'Deschooling', which arrived on the scene around the 60's, offered
already in its time a wíde-ranging critícism of this kind of education that lames us lest we should fail to
satisfy the economic needs of the 'real world' (Lister, 1974).
57
 Hermeneutical ethics, which we will comment on later, has defended the view that. there ;s another
educational function in learning foreign languages or in being acquainted with dead tongues. This consists in
instructing us on how to open up to conceptual and vital worlds that may be radically different from ours, in
order to edúcate us within tolerance and the ability to gain knowledge of what is different (Gadamer, 1960.
III, 14, !; 1977a, 260; !977b, 17; 1959, 64; 1986, 57, 174; 1990). This way, we would further what Carlos
Thiebaut (1999, 56-63) calis active 'positive tolerance', as against the merely negative or passive one, which
'allows' the othcrs to have a different culture without letting us come near them and get edified by their
valúes. An example of the link between active tolerance and the fact of being open to foreign languages can
be seen in the difference between Anglo-Saxon colonisation of America, which is the model of passive
tolerance, and Hispanic colonisation of America, with its ideal of active tolerance (Rubert de Ventos, 1987).
As all ideáis, this ideal was not achieved every time, needless to say. But, by and large, it had decidedly
estimable upshots: Thus, while Spain prometed the compilation and learning (even at university) of the
native languages, as an active way to show respect ('hermeneutical' avant la lettre) for the diversity of their
native speakers (Bustamante, 1992), England did naught in that sense. This contributed to convert Latin
America into an expcrience of ethnic crossbrceding and cultural hybridisation, something that did not
happen in the case of the English-speaking part of America. Henee, England would have been more
'modern' - if it is true that Modernity tends to extermínate linguistic and dialectal diversity (Derrida, 1990)
- than the 'hermeneutical' genre of settlement carried out by Spain; and nowadays, the United States look
forward to being 'modern' too, spccially in cases such as the one which writers like Rodríguez (1982)
representa.
38
 This has been dubbed 'State realism'; see the alternative proposed by Beer and Hariman (1996).
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59fosters a narrow-minded jingoism, and makes the State sure that its subjects will
behave as obedient followers in the case of a conflict (or simple commercial
competidveness) with a foreign power (second of Nietzsche's functions). The social
reality is also present in schools, where pupils are taught the main and lesser social rules
or ethical behaviour (third function); and the natural and material reality is definitcly
at hand for students as they are trained in the different ways to domínate the world we
f i j
live in through technology and Natural Science (fourth function). " The educational
system is very demanding about this peremptory, real world, and overwhelms us with
its realistic demands. Considering this, Rosa Q. Ñ., as well as other modern disciples of
Schopenhauer, have contented themselves with vending music as a plañe ticket which
would take us on a brief (and well-deserved) vacation from 'reality' to a suitable
holiday resort in an 'unreal' world, accompanied by Brahms, Gilíes Binchois or Miles
Davis.
Despite all this, and despite the fact that Schopenhauer's (and young Nietzsche's)
successors accept this cohabitarían with the four 'realistic' functions of education, such
a modus vivendi has made them somewhat feebler: music is no longer offered as a
global alternative to the other educational functions, but only as a sporadic, temporary
one. The bou pensant 'pacifism' of these Schopenhauerian heirs towards the realistic
spirit of the remaining four educational functions has made them, to some extent,
w
 Those who, like Maclntyre (1984), defend an education in this sense, relapsa therefore into the modern
outlook once more, in spite of their hopes to overeóme it.
"" Osear Wilde (1891, 213) had already drawn attention to the fact that a serious knowledge of other countries
is the best antidote against militarisnr. "The change will of course be slow, and people will not be conscious
of it. They will not say, 'We will not war against France because her prose is perfect', but because the prose
of France is perfect, they will not hale the land. Intellectual criticism will bind Europc together with bonds
far closer than those that can be forged by shopman or sentimentalist. It will give us the peace that springs
from understanding." We must underline that Wilde's reference to 'understanding' is concomitant to the
Verstandigung through the dialogue proposed by hermeneutical ethics, as we shall see in section 3.2.; and
his reference to the 'shopman' clearly reflects the sort of anti-utilitarian assessment anticipated by Nietzsche
as regards the first educational function of modern education mentioned above.
Heidegger's criticism of this 'humanising' function is already a classic (Heidegger, 1947). See also Vattimo
(1981).
^ Heidegger (1957) provides another classic and influential analysis of this function of technology (and of the
Ge-Stell world towards which it pushcs us). See also Vattimo (1988b), and, on scientific education in
general, see Quintana Paz (1998b, 2001a).
81
Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz
accomplices of the very Philistinism of those functions they wanted to fight or, at least,
substitute (Adorno, 1973; Perniola, 1990, 58, 61). For, thanks to this fifth function of
education, the other four are devoid every now and then of the eventual weariness
caused by their realistic demands, and may grow to be more commanding (Semel in
anno licet insanire). In this sense, as long as we consider Schopenhauer as our educator,
there will always remain a certain feeling of 'defeat' (Perniola, 1990, 66) about the
place of music as an educational instrument. A defeat that not only forces us to conform
to the remaining small área that the four prevailing educational functions allow music to
have, but also obliges us to act there in the solé interest of those four functions, acting as
a 'relax zone' for them.
3. Hermeneutical Ethics: Lookingfor a Surrogate Educator after Schopenhauer
3.1. The end ofModernity and the (all-too expected) nostalgia ofpre-Modemity
In the previous sections we have contemplated the history of a loss: of how music
ceased to be focal in European education, as it was at a time when the Western
intelligentsia regarded it as the paradigm which best displayed the harmonious structure
of both the world and human beings (and between world and human beiogs). We have
also witnessed how music became a sepárate subject, detached from anything related to
the order of the universe, since it started to assume the task of enabling people to escape
from that universe, which began to be viewed as governed by a set of mechanical,
impersonal laws. We have watched how music, about 350 years ago, became an affair
exclusively designed for musicians and those who wanted to enjoy it (as had been
yearned for by Aristotle 2300 years before). Finally, we have checked how such a
seclusion of music was propitiated not merely by people like Kant, who did not feel
much deference towards this kind of art, but equally by those, like Schiller or
Schopenhauer, who revered musical sounds wilh the most unfathomable ardour. All of
them willingly agreed that music, in the end, was exclusively helpful for musical
activities, activities that were fully disengaged from everything that had to do with
economy, politics, social relations or science. Nietzsche craved to make Western culture
counter these four utilitarian ends of modern education, focussing on the sort of
aesthetical education that Schiller and Schopenhauer had praised before. Yet, he simply
encouraged the additíon of a fifth function to the four existing ones, a fifth function that
both supporters and detractors considered useless. This is the kind of function that,
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nowadays, justifies the teaching of music at high schools amidst more useful subjects,
such as second languages or computer science.
This is our situation as inheritors of Modernity. But, from the outset of the present
article, we wondered whether we could still dub ourselves modern, that is to say,
whether we could still consider Schopenhauer our educator - as stated by Nietzsche's
title. May we, in exchange, return to the pre-modern age, when music had a more
prominent role? Or should we, rather, devise a new behavioural pattern, a new 'ethics',
in order to approach music and its function within education?
As to the first matter, it must be pointed out that there is no need to be exceptionally
good interpreters of our own Zeitgeist in order to realise that, as time goes by, it is
becomíng harder and harder to sustain the orthodox creed of Modernity and
Romanticism about reality - and about music. It would certainly be a Herculean
challenge to attempt to recapitúlate here all the good grounds for such a conviction, a
conviction which Ortega y Gasset (1923) already labelled as "the main issue of our
time." " However, we can try to succinctly enumérate the main leaks that initiated the
sinking of the boat launched by Descartes, Newton and Kant. One of them is the fact
that serious doubts have been arising, for the first time, about the cultural hegemony of
science, which from the 17th century onwards had the privilege of stating the rational
Truth about the physical, natural world. For scientific methods attested not to be so
'rational' as it was formerly believed. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), by
Thomas S. Kuhn. is a classic reference about this discovery - so classic, that it has been
the most quoted Humanities book in the last lustrums, according to recent inquiries.
Kuhn and, some years later, P. K. Feyerabend (1974) proved that for science to work
properly it must not merely follow rational-methodical rules, and thus its modus
operandi does not differ so much from that of other disciplines such as Humanities or
Art. These revelations had a fatal effect on the credibility of science as an instrument to
monopolise the rational discourse about reality. But, at the same time, they contributed
to deconstruct the modern-romantic image of a world divided into two antagonistic
realms: that of things and that of human beings; since science, the queen of the domain
of things, was no longer so dissimilar to the kinglets of the world of humans (like art,
humanities, religión, poütics and so on).
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As we can see, this main issue of 'our' (in fact, Ortega's) times has indeed been going on for several
decades after Ortega, which contributes to make it even more complex for us to intend to present here a
global appraisal of the topic.
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At the same time that these foundations of the modern image of the world of objects
commenced to crumble, the pillars that supported its image of the world of human
subjects began to quake likewise. Humans, essentially thinking beings according to
Descartes and distinctively/ree beings according to Kant, gradually lost this poise, and
the suspícion aróse of whether mankind had neither so much rationality ñor a so deeply
rooted liberty in its inner self, and thus, human beings were not so unlike the other
creatures. Darwin set off this kind of misgiving, but it was chiefly Marx, Freud and
Nietzsche himself who exhibited the soundest basis to suspect (Ricocur, 1965) that
humans are not so free as they supposed they were, ñor do they grasp their inner,
rational life so accurately: since countless social, psychological, moral and religious
traps dcceive the human mind relentlessly, making il extremely complicated for it to
achieve such aims as real freedom or truthful thinking. Consequently, if we still desired
to define human beings as that which is free and self-aware, like Moderns did, we
should have lo admit Foucault's sorrowful "death of the human being" (1966, 398): The
only way to prevent this pitiful outcome would be to replace the modern concept of
human beings with a less ambitious one.
Art also has been devoid of any ingenuous modern, romantic ideas concerning its
role within society. The na'íve belief that it is a completely detached discipline is no
longer plausible, ñor is it suitable to assume that it remains unbiased-by economy,
politics or mundane concerns, as advócales of the notion of 'artislic genius' and
'Romantic creation' fancied, when Ihey placed the arts beyond everyday life (Perniola,
1990). The artislic avant-garde movements, as well as all those who have seriously
reflected upon the actual condition of arl, have done a fruitful Job in order to discard the
credo that both arl and music belong lo a world Ihat is radically separated from the rest
of rcality; a credo known (and criticised) under the term 'aesthelic conscience'
(Gadamer, 1958; 1960,1,1, 3; I, II; Vattimo, 1992, 90-98).
Afler all these attacks on 'objectivily' and 'subjectivity', which were the two
columns that supported ihe modern siandpoinl of realily, il seems a little loo daring lo
remain in Ihal posilion and keep Ihe same perspective. And pcrhaps it is too bold not
jusl from an inlellcclual but also from a practica! point of view: Is it really convenient to
leave the decisions concerning Nature lo physics, which invenled the atomic bomb, or
maybc to technology, which helped to come by the Konzentrationslager, or to
chemistry, which keeps polluting our spoiled planel? Is it unavoidable to leave the
organisalion of sociely lo ulilitarian economisls and politicians? Are we allowed to
continué to use art only as a way to escape (during the hour and a half of a film, or
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during the forty minutes of a symphony) from the well-known lacerating realities of our
joint 'Spaceship Earth', as K. E. Boulding called it?
It is a bone of contention whether the main motive for us to question Modernily is in
fací its theorelical problems, as Ortega held (1941, 524); or whether it is due to practica!
worries, such as those we have just pointed out, thal we mislrust the theory of Ihe
Moderns, as Valtimo pleads (1994, 37-39). In any case, either because of Iheoretical or
pragmatic reasons, Modernity seems increasingly powerless lo bail us oul in our
presenl-day and fulure concerns. And, as usual, such momenls of crisis are prolific in
prophels who intend to solve today's Iroubles by resorling to a happy golden past,
where such troubles did nol and could not even exisl. They are Ihe typical preachers
who sermonize upholding the return to an idyllic past spirit, where everything was more
stable, profiting from ihe palpable crumbling down of Ihe present spirit. In this specific
case, they propose to replace the decayed modern structures with the also decayed (at
their time) and long-forgotten pre-modern ones. They miss pre-modern ages, and hope
to take Iheir revenge and make up for the defeal they suffered four hundred years ago,
by taking advantage of the present weaknesses of Modernity (their enemy once upon a
time). Throughout the 20th century, we have been spectators of the revival of assorted
trends postulating the return to pre-Modernity, be it the Greek or Ihe medieval species
of il, or any of ils still existing genus in those cultures which have not endured the
64
consequences of Modernity. The appeal of such a revival has tempted all the various
áreas of cullure, from polilics (Maclnlyre, 1981; Rivera, 2000) lo religión (Ihe so-called
'New Age' was in this une); from abstract, academic onlologícal Iheories (Severino,
1982) to the frivolous passion of mobs of lourists towards the exolicism ihat they
bclieve to discover in 'pre-modern' nations, or in a shallow orientalism.
As to musical education, there have also been many allempls to overeóme the
problems posed by the model thal suggested 'Schopenhauer as an cducator' by
rcgaining the oíd allernalive Ihat put forward Tythagoras as an educator' and which
14
 Sec footnote 21 for some examples of such reviváis. From among the authors mentionecl before, Small
(1980) ¡s the one who seems to most fervently subscribe to this solution, which consists of retrieving the
traits of pre-modern ages or places.
Sometimes, tourists are not the only ones to be bewitched by the conviction that they have found out a more
'authentic' visión of the world in other cultures, more authentic than the hesitan! remains that we currently
inherit from Modernity. Think, for instance, how the reputed anthropologist Lévy-Strauss (1955) was under
the same delusion, as Derrida (1967) pointed out.
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was so successful back in the times of Lorenzo and Dorotea. Let us simply bear in mind
some well-known contemporary attempts to link, in the most literally Pythagorean
maniera, music with mathematics, with the harmony of the universe and with the
internal order of the human soul (although now 'human soul' is called 'brain', and its
interna! order is called 'mental rules'). It is a quite remarkable detall that such efforts
frequently take Johann Sebastian Bach as their paradigm (a trend that Goethe pioneered
when he referred to Bach's music the way we have seen he did, as a key to grasping
God's organization of the natural world). Even though such attempts pretend to
bolster the role of 'Bach as an educator', it is not a hard task to notice that their real spirit
aspires to recover Tythagoras as an educator': their goal is to convince people that the
world is such, that brain, universe and music go together in full harmony within it.
Instead of all this, my aim is to provide a different possibility, neither a pre-modern
ñor a modern one, proposing music in general and Bach in particular as the adequate
educators for us: passing from 'Schopenhauer ais Erzieher' (quoting Nietzsche) to
'Bach ais Erzieher' without going through 'Pythagoras ais Erzieher' over again. It is
one of my most deep-rooted convictions that it proves to be utterly implausible to revisit
Pythagoras as our main educator: who dares nowadays to back the faith of ancient
Greeks in a harmonic and scientifically demonstrable accord between world, man and
gods, and in the capability of music to paradigmatically represent'such'a unión? Not
even so sympathetic approaches to music as Lovelock's ecologist outlook (1979) share
such a fierce optimism, and those who do, as for instance Thomas (1983) or the so-
called 'New Age', may seem a mere 'dilettantism', as Jifí Fukac suspects in his
contribution to this book. Is it possible to pour what we may cali the new wine of our
'knowledge society' and our 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington, 1996) into the oíd
wineskin of the belief that world, man and music are ruled by the same sort of
harmony? Besides, I do not feel compelled to keep up a dying Modernity, where neither
objects ñor individuáis, neither science ñor art can be regarded in the same light as
beforc, only for fear that whatever will come next could be 'even worse' (worse than
* In his article, which is included in this book, Jifí FukaC mentions similar examples such as those of the
biologist Lewis Thomas (1983) or Hofstadter (1979), who tried to establish a link between music, artificial
intelligence and logic. Some other anieles of this volume, such as those by Jan Slovák or Petr Osolsobé,
share to a certain extent this very bent to consider music as something helpful in order to understand the
world, just like Pre-moderns did. As to the parallel belief in the influence of music on our moráis, in a puré
Damon of Oa's style, there are current authors, such as Umberto Eco (1963), who also look back on it
nostalgically. Pythagoras does not lack disciples yet.
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what? one feels tempted to ask). We simply need to assume the challenge of a world
and of an education that may not be like the ones (modern and pre-modern) we used to
i • 67have earher.
How should such an education for today be? What kind of role should music play in
it, given that it ought to be different from the pre-modern one, where it would unveil the
harmony of the Whole, but it must also be dissimilar to the modern one, where it would
only help us to escape from the Whole? What we have formerly defined as
'hermeneutical ethics'' may give us a clue about these questions concerning our Babel-
like knowledge society.
3.2. Hermeneutical ethics in education: An outline ofa new role for music
In section 2, we reviewed the main differences between the Pre-modern and the
Modern projects, paying only Hule attention to the similarities between these two
mentalities. However, it is a matter of fact that such connections exist and are
prominent; moreover, it could hardly be otherwise since both Weltanschauungen are
genetically linked (one is the ancestor of the other) and both achieved success in the
same geographical context - Europe. The most apparent of these resemblances is
perhaps a shared misgiving towards the concept of historicity - what Heidegger referred
to as 'Geschichtlichkeif (1927, § 6, §§ 72-77) and Ortega y Gasset (1935, 40) termed
as 'razón histórica'.
For Pre-moderns, the world had always been a harmonic unity (although, there was
a hot-blooded underlying controversy, "de aeternitate mundi', based on whether
'always' meant 'for all eternity', as proposed by ancient Greeks and by the followers of
Should it be 'posl-modern', then? This term has been used by so many authors and in so many different
ways that I believe that it has grown to be already more confusing than illuminating; thus, we had better not
answer such a queslion, just by appealing to the fact that it does not make much sense anymore. Many
authors who subscribed such a term at the beginnmg, back in the 80s (Rorty, 1983; Vattimo, 1984), have
almost completely discarded it by now, at least in the late 90's. From now onwards, I will preferably use the
term 'hermeneutics' in order to distinguish my proposal of 'Bach as an educator' from the pre-modern and
the modern ones.
68
 See references in footnote 20.
87
Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz.
Averroes,69 or whether it meant 'from the moment when it was created by God', as
Orthodox Jews, Muslims and Chrístians believed ). Consequently, history and time,
change and corruption, had basically nothing to do with the world, ñor with its essence
(harmonic order), given that the world was perfect and musically harmonic precisely
because time would never affect it; the Universe was immutable, and never ever was to
show signs of ageing or lacking harmony. Pre-moderns found it unnecessary, therefore,
lo bring inlo play ihe concept of history in order to comprehend better the relevant
features of reality.
Moderns agreed overall with Pre-modcrns about this. Although they drove a wedge
between subject and object, history was equally superfluous in order to understand both
worlds, just as unnecessary as it was for Pre-modern mentality in order to come to terms
with the one and only world. The world of objects would be studied by natural sciences
and mathematics, whose laws were fixed and permanent, Ihus non-hislorical, jusl as the
harmony proposed by Greeks and medieval men. It was not until the coining of the
concept of 'entropy' (Carnot, 1824) in physics (al a time when history was also
developing into a relevant issue for many other spheres of Western culture, such as
Hegel's philosophy or J. L. David's paintings), that history could attract any interés!
from the point of view of scienlific research - a kind of research which has always
pretended to focus specifically on those eternal natural laws that never modify.1
Similarly, the world of subjectivity did nol give way lo any special interest in
hislory. According lo bolh Descartes and Kant, the most striking attribute of human
inner life, Ihe altribute thal needed lo be clarified, was its startling capacity to cope with
"" See Plato's Republic, 608d, or Aristotle's Metaphysics, XII 6, I071b 2-20. On Averroes, see Gilson (1965,
339).
7(1
 Saint Augustine, Saint Bonaventure and Étienne Tempier, archbishop of Paris, conlributed to this view; the
latter by condcmning Ihe alternalive approach in 1270, Nonetheless, other belicvers, such as Saint Albertus
Magnus, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Maimonides were less reslriclive (Rohner, 1913).
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 Soon after the concept of 'entropy' had opencd a brcach of 'historicity' in physics, more and more sciences
(such as evolutionary biology, geology, cosmology and so on) began to be in daily need of history as a
category for their research projects, contravening the orthodox Modern creed of the unavailability of the
category 'history' for the study of the Universe. This disobcdience of Modern commandments by the very
natural sciences that were supposed to be the main allies of Modernity would finally add to the problems
that we have already mentioned in 3.1. and which would casi serious doubts on the correctness of Modern
mentality.
88
On Hermeneutical Ethics and Education: 'Bach ais Erzieher'
immutable (thus non-hislorical) cognilive principies, ils astonishing ability to grasp the
eternal laws that organized the also immutable physical world. According lo
Schopenhauer and the Romantícs, the most noteworthy quality of arl and music was
their power to abduct us from the hlstorical world, with its temporaral dudes and
concerns, and to let us live out Ihe experience (Erlebnis) of a realily beyond time and
history (Gadamer, 1960, I, I, 2, 2-3; I, I, 3). As we have already seen in section 3.1.,
after Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset and the avant-garde movements, it is no
longer satisfactory to have faith in an 'a-histórica!' individual.
Unlike the Pre-moderns and the Moderns, the projecl of hermeneulical ethics cannot
pcrsist in overlooking Ihe concepl of history in order to undersland Ihings and human
beings. This means Ihat neilher Ihe fact Ihal everylhing is perishable, ñor Ihe passage of
time can be disdained or considered a mere incidenl. On the contrary, it is necessary to
break fresh ground and accept that any human plan to understand anything (world, gods
or human beings) will be characterised by two unavoidable features, lwo fealures Ihal
define Ihe historical dimensión of human beings. The first one is Ihat humans are finite,
ephemeral, mortal beings (Heidegger, 1927, § 50-53); and the second one is Ihal, being
transient, ihey are conditioned and historically changed by Ihe circumstances that
they come to find in Iheir transit through life, by Iheir specific contexis (Orlega, 1935,
32-33). Any individual and the different situalions Ihey may face ihroughout their lives
share a common fealure: they cannot be understood in a plausible way without laking
inio account their historical dimensión, their precariousness and their contextual
conditioning. Thus, for inslance, while carrying oul a scienlific study, we should keep in
mind thal the 'history of science' proves Ihal science is nol such an accumulalive
process or accurate progress as many scientific manuals pretend; and, by doing so, we
could hinder the spreading of many innocent mylhs about the infallibility of science -
and protect ourselves against the myslifying 'power' of Ihose myths. It is not by chance
that Thomas S. Kuhn (1962), being the philosopher who had done most to
demythologise science, was himself a scholarly historian of science. Another good
example of the availability of hisloricity in order lo clear up a cullural sphere is the one
2
 We must bear in mind that, in spite of having written an anti-historical plea entitled "On the Use and Abuse
of History for Life" in his second Unzeitgemaf!e Betrachíung (1874a), in fact Nietzsche addressed his
criticisms in this work towards 'history' as 'historiography' (Historie, rerum gestarían), that ís to say,
towards the knowledge or awareness of history, but not towards history as the finite and mutable character
of our life (Geschichte, res gestae). In addition, he even changed his derisive ideas about Historie later on
(Vattimo, 1984, 173; 1985a, 28).
89
Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz
provided by politics: if we take into account our changing history, we will be able to
place ourselves in a sceptical position and be suspicious of the absolutist affectation of
certain political programmes, such as orthodox Marxism or neo-liberalism a la
Fukuyama (1992). We could denounce such programmes for merely consisting in a
contradictory attempt to find out the immutable and therefore a-historical laws "
underlying the mutable reality of human history.
Taking history into account could have positive effects on musical education as
well. It would help to change the idea that music serves musical purposes only. During
the Pre-modern epoch, the aim of music was to establish some kind of link between
humans and the eternal arder of the universe and soul; during Modernity, it sought to
connect us to an arder that would differ from the mechanical order of physics - the
arder of inner feelings. Now, on the contrary, that same music is ready to be a
privileged instrument so as to make us feel that we are in contact with the absence of
eternal orders. How? Well, since music can no longer link us with any culturally
accepted order, like the aforementioned and bygone ones, it can enable us to feel that
the only 'metaphysical' connection one can experience today is the bond to other fellow
beings (composers, players, listeners, dancers, amateurs) who are ephemeral as we are.
In other words, it connects us with our 'histórica! being', with our historicity. Lacking
the celestial harmony among the spheres and for want of Shopenhauer's transcendental
world of Will, music compels us to accept that all we have and all it may put us in
relation with are immanent, temporal things. Immanent things such as the particular
man and the particular moment in history that produced a particular composition; or
the different men and the different ages that have preserved and transmitted that
73
 Curiously enough, highlighting the historical dimensión in ihe relativist sensc that we defend will prevem us
from being historiéis! in the sense of "believing that we have grasped the permanent essence of the laws of
history", which was the sense of 'historicism' that Karl R. Popper (1945, 1957) slated so often. Lukács
(1923) and Kosík (1963) had already criticised orthodox Marxism before, because it had precisely
overlooked the historical dimensión (and, therefore, the mutability) of the very laws of history. Fukuyama's
neo-liberalism had also been rejected by neo-liberals since he believed in a historical determinism (the
determinism that leads to the establishment of democratic regimes on the whole Earth), determinism that
would contradict the undetermined freedom of the individual that should be the basis for all kinds of
libcrtarianism (Jiménez Losamos, 1993, 50-61).
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 This possibility of contacting past human beings with a different visión of the world is what Dilthey
(1907-1910, 215-216) considers more relevant about artistic experience. See, more particularly on music,
Dilthey (1907-1910, 220-224).
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composition to us; or those from among the human community who know how to
judge and enjoy it nowadays. In the process of learning how to apprecíate music, we
are unavoidably taught to evoke our radically historical dimensión: Should we really
want to comprehend a musical piece, we would have to bear in mind the specific
historical perspective of those who lived in a different time and in a different place (and
also composed in a different way). We would also have to make use of our historical
and provisional methods, namely, the temporary existing community of those who are
able to 'understand' the music that comes from afar, and of those who are able to
'interpret' it for us. All that becomes a weighty reminder of our ephemeral condition
and of our limitations within our specific context. It turns into a hefty thrust towards the
careful musing of the distance between us and the past, a distance which is not only
chronological (due to the passage of years according to a calendar), but also conceptual,
spiritual: in one word, it is a historical distance.
Thus, musical education not only trains us to listen, compose and play music, but
also, by noticing the absence of one of the previous orders which lay beyond music, it
edúcales us according to a mentality of precariousness, of the ephemeral, of historicity;
a mentality that, as we have already seen, is quite coherent with today's world. It
instructs us within a kind of ethics or way of life in which the only point that can be
taken as a reference is the rest of human beings, those who might play or appreciate
music, because there is no other fixed, a-historical reference point to judge from. It
teaches us that the fixed and eternal order in the world of objects or in the world of
individuáis is no longer the only possible authority. Instead, authority springs from the
circumstantial (historical) disorder of mortal beings, it moves and changes and it is
subject to constant revisión and refutation.
This takes us to the second function of musical education nowadays, apart from that
of linking us to relativity and history. Somehow, music teaches us how to transcend our
'
5
 This is what Gadamer (1960, II, II, 9, 4; II, II, I I ) has called Wirkungsgeschichte ('history of effects'), or
what has been called 'reception aesthetics' from the Constance School onwards (Warning, 1975).
6
 Vattimo (1989c) has defended this ability of art to 'créate communities', starting from Kant's suggestion,
when he considered aesthetíc judgement something typical of an intersubjectivity (1790), and following
Gadamer's paradigmatic developments (1960).
See Vattimo's reflections (1985b) on what he calis the relevance of 'monuments' (artistic works from the
past) in order to transinit these experiences to us.
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own historical context in order to establish a dialogue with other temporal and spatial
contexts. The first reason for it is that, if absolute orders do not exist outside human
beings anymore, it makes no sense to confine oneself to one's own circumstances, as if
they were in fact the only absolute order. Fundamentalism stops making sense once it is
proved that there are no fundaments (Vattimo, 1988a).
But there is a second reason for this instruction on dialogue with other places and
times that music conveys us. Apart from prevenling absolutism and confinement in our
narrow contexts, music can edify us in order to help us get in contact with what does not
form part of ourselves, with what is outside these narrow circumstances of our own. It
trains us in how to contact different cultures, either from the present or from the past, to
which we can offer the best of ourselves, and from which we can receive the best of
them. Indeed, every time we interpret something from a different period and a different
place, we must receive the best that such period and such place are offering us, but we
must at the same time offer our best skills in order to interpret it in a respectful way.
Thus, music edúcales in this quid pro quo, whereby we allow what is different to
converse with us (from the outside) and, at the same time, we try to intégrate it in our
specific context (because if it were to be left completely outside, no interaction would
lake place). Therefore (Dilthey 1907-1910, 225), we neither let ourselves be completely
transponed away to the world of the different (we would stop being ourselves, this
would not be communication, but assimilation), ñor remain impassive (for this would
also attest a failure in communication: the difference would not have spoken to us).
After the dialogue with someone else's composition, we are not the same person as the
composer, but neither the same person as we were before listening to it or playing it.
Corning into contact with that musical piece and understanding it changes us, but, at the
same time, it changes that musical piece too, because the way we play it or listen to it
brings forward its potential, which could not have been revealed before our getting in
contact with it (Eco, 1962).
Such a dialogue with music, in which it transforms us and is transformed by us as
wcll, calis for a special rclevancc in today's education, because it offers a model of a
sort of dialogue in which no fixed rules are followed. No instruction booklet contains
any exact explanation of how to interpret just a single musical composition, let alone all
musical compositíons from different times and different cultures. (In the hypothetical
case that such a manual should come into existence, the question of "how to interpret
the instructions ín it" would come up immediately; and if there should be another
manual to interpret the previous one, the question, and the problem, could repeat
78themselves once more and ad infinitum.') So, in order to interpret something different,
it is necessary to approach it (in this case, music) ín a wholly individualised way,
without subsuming its difference to any general or abstract schema; we must try to
adapt it to our own circumstances in a suitable specific way, without ignoring either its
difference or our concrete context. This is the model of interpretative dialogue to which
music accustoms us.
And, indeed, such a model can prove to be highly instructive nowadays: Is it not the
soundest paradigm for us to approach our contemporary dialogues in general? Let us
think about intercultural dialogue, for instance, which is essential in order to face those
problems that can only be dealt with on a global level (e.g., ecology, hunger, AIDS,
underdevelopment, etc.). Up to now, the West has followed the colonialist, authoritative
model imposed by the Moderns in order to deal with such problems. (We must keep in
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mind that Modernity was at its height between the 17th and the 19th centuries, at the
time when European imperialist expansión was at its height too.) Such a modern model
oí problem solving from the West seemed to be simple in theory, but turned out to be an
utter failure in actual practice: it intended to impose Western solutions and priorities as
the only way to act towards the problems of others; solutions that only Westerners were
able to find out and to carry through, due to their privileged access to scientist
rationality. This was Modernity's model: if the West had already discovered the laws of
reason, the only thing to do was apply them to humankind without asking its opinión.
78
 This well-known problem shows up in philosophers such as Kant (1781a; 1790. § 7) and Wittgenstein
(1953, §§ 198-240): il is the problem of how to interpret any given rule in general. It is useless to provide
new rules in order to interpret a first given rule, since these new ones would also stand in need of a certain
interpretador), and the problem mulliplies itself. But, then, do we simply interpret rules in an arbitrary way?
Moreover, if it is so, why do we agree so often? See Gadamer (1960, I, I, 1, 2c).
'' In fact, the adventure of European expansión did not start as late as the 17th century, for Columbus had
already discovered America back in 1492, Hernán Cortés had wiped out the Aztec Empire back in 1521, and
Francisco Pizarra had done the same with that of the Incas in 1532. Yet, we can exclude the Spanish
conques! from what we cali 'modern colonisation' precisely because of its being so premature: this might
have been the reason why it was not a mere imposition or transfer of the European framework, as later carne
to pass on the Eastern coast of North America, but a fruitful mixture of Spanish and Indian features (see also
Rubert de Ventos, 1987). Instead, the conques! of Northern America by the English and French, which took
place from the 17th century onwards, and also the colonisation of África by the English, French, Belgians,
Dutch, Portuguese, Germans, Italians and Spaniards in the 19th century have the two traits that we link herc
as correlated: they followed fully the modern frame of mind and, therefore, they did not favour crossing
cultures, mongrel identities and mixed dialogues, but one-sided imposition.
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Should any human refuse to accept these rational laws, it would only be because he/she
was irrational and, therefore, his/her opinión would not be worthy of consideration; as
everybody would finally have to admit these rational laws, why waste time asking for
their explicit acceptance? Nowadays, though, this model proposed by Moderns is not
helpful any more: there is an increasing number of non-Western cultures asking for their
opinions to be taken into account, and also asking for Western priorities (like our
capitalism, our model of family, our model of democracy, our religious secularisation)
to stop being considered the most rational ones from the start (Huntington, 1996).
This is our condition, then: there is an urgent need for a dialogue among cultures,
but we lack a set of previous common rules - such as that proposed by the Moderns - to
decide which of the views defended through such dialogue has the right to prevail. In
these circumstances, the hermenéutica! model for a dialogue without previous
standards, which integrales the best of each interlocutor, becomes not only appealing,
but also extremely adequate... and necessary. And it is music, as we saw before, which
gives us a fairly good illustration of how to carry out such dialogues. Music has always
succeeded, and is constantly succeeding, in integrating elements from different times
and cultures, blending them together, interpreting and reinterpreting, becoming
influential and being influenced: and all that without previous, unanimously accepted
standards (which would be so unimaginable as 'the standards accórding to which all
musical pieces must be composed'); but also without being merely arbitrary ('anything
goes', 'no matter how we compose, everything will have an equal valué'). In short,
music has become the scenery where a dialogue like the one we term as 'hermeneutical'
has been taking place since time immemorial. Thus, why not profit from musical
educación in order to come up with an idea of how to implement those future
inescapable intercultural dialogues, which lack fixed problem-solving standards? Would
it not be beneficial if pupils were acquainted with a cultural sphere, like music, where
pleasing things have been created without strict rules for centuries, but where not every
whimsical desire is valid; a cultural sphere where the self is only a starting point in
ko
order to intermingle with the different?
0
 An author so unlikely to develop a sentimentalist or aesthetic approach as the analytical philosopher Hilary
Putnam (1992) has also been persuaded by the idea that music portrays a model of how to carry out a
rational dialogue when there are no initial fixed rules. This idea had also captivated Wittgenstein (1967,
147) before. Within hermeneutical philosophy, Gadamer (1993) has explicitly mentioned music as the
paradigm for the hermeneutical dialogue he proposed: "Each present has its own üving space, its own
tradition, which shows in the different customs and uses, in the different social institutions [...]. We need to
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We have already spotted two new educational functions of music: The first one
resides in bringing us to be on familiar terms with our historical dimensión (and without
considering historicity there is not much we can grasp about our present-day condition).
The second one consists in letting us be acquainted with dialogues that do not possess
prior rational rules, but nevertheless are able to intégrate contributions from different
Q j
cultures, building up on contingently shared understandings, We may also put forward
a third function which is closely related to the previous ones, and which could even be
considered their consequence. If wc gain knowledge through music about our finiteness,
and, thanks to it, also learn how to learn from others (even if what we may learn could
be thoroughly dissimilar from what we used to think, or from what we used to think we
could learn); then, as a consequence, we can readily become skilled at doubting about
ourselves as well. If we are historical, mortal beings, and if everything we do (even
thinking) is conditioned by our life projects (Heidegger, 1927), it is entirely reasonable
to cast a certain air of doubt on the circumstantial thoughts of the present, which might
link our own absolutist aims [...] with the recognition of other different traditions, trying even to develop
comrnon solidarities [...]. Artistic experience can motívate humankind to carry out this task. In fact, we can
aiso fmd in art certain highly demanding traditions and highly marked styles. At times, it is not easy for us
to get in contact with artistic creations from different times and cultures. Yct, on the long term, [...] [art] can
build a bridge beyond barriers and beyond places. Nowadays, this is amazingly evident for us in music. See,
for instance, how the Far East has adopted Mozart, Schuberl and all the European music in a few decades,
and how those musicians from the Far East count among the main figures of our musical life. Besides, as we
all know, Europe has also assimilated many elements from the musical language of África." In the present
book, readers will also be able to find other verifications of this in the articles by Detlef Félix (on the
musical dialogue between cultures), Yvetta Kajanová and Norbert Adamov (on the musical dialogue
between styles), Widmar Hader (on the musical dialogue between different ages), Lenka Stránská (on the
musical dialogue between music and other arts) and Jiirgen Mahrenholz (on the dialogue betwcen creeds by
means of music).
Throughout Modernity, people first tried to discover what they should have in common, in order to be able
later to estabüsh a dialogue upon those grounds (Kant's apriori forms, Cartesian clear and distinct ideas,
e
'c.). Nowadays, since all those 'foundations' to establish 'a possiblc dialogue' have failed, we can keep on
iooking for new foundations (like the philosophers K.O. Apel and J. Habermas do); but we can also do as
we propose here and take our contingently and circumstantially common elements as a starting point in
order to make new agreements. This option is the central point in Gadamer's and Vattimo's philosophies.
and has also been defended by different means by Camps (1991), Brandom (1994) and Quintana Paz (1997,
1999, 200Ib). It was, as well, the option chosen in order to carry out musical dialogues such as the one that
gave way to the creation ol'jazz, and that originated in the incidental similarities that existed between black
and European music (Schuller, 1968, 43).
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change through contexts yet to come. And, in case we crave to intégrate someone else's
ideas in our own Ufe, we cannot consider such life complete and perfect from the start.
In both fashions, music smoothes the progress of relativizing our prior customs and
certainties.
Moreover, there are other ways in which music does such self-relativization, ways
that are not simply consequential of the two aforementioned functions of music, bul
more direct. For instance, when we listen to or play a musical piece from other periods
or cultures (or just a piece composed by a different author), we realize in practico that
different human beings may see things in an altogether diverse manner, but mis does not
mean that they (or we) are necessarily wrong. Not all people who compose differently
from us do it incorrectly; instead, we listen or try to interpret people far away from our
procedures knowing that paying attention to them is worth the effort. Here, thus, we are
taught to overeóme the modern dogma about truth (if two things are different, one of
them is inevitably wrong), and relativize our means and opinions. Another example of
relativization is the one produced when we devote part of our time to a musical
experience: Even though this experience may not be so metaphysical as Schopenhauer
desired, we are nevertheless learning through it to leave our daily concerns and
priorities aside for a moment. We are, for a moment, relativizing ourselves, our society
and our daily lives, and paying attention to another kind of reality and possibilities
(Vattimo, 1986). We are, to sum up, detaching ourselves from 'real' valúes such as
profitability and usefulness (think of the four types of selfishness denounced by
Nietzsche) and leaving them in parentheses, at least from time to time, while a musical
piece is gripping us. A third example of self-questioning through music: our inability to
carry out a 'perfect' performance, or even to understand what 'perfect' would mean
00
herc, also helps us to suspect our own convictions. And a last example: when we
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 Alessandro Baricco (1992) faces overtly today's clrawbacks in finding a valué for music in our world, after
the Modern-Romantic era: "The very idea of considering educated music a 'valué', which has to be
promoted and defended, is not legitímate in f'act, in spite of its being supported by the slogans that we have
inherited uncomplainingly. [...] Does anyone know how to explain why a young person who prefers Chopin
to U2 should be a cause of comfort for society?" But, in the end, Baricco coincides with the proposal of
hermeneutical ethics, and conjectures that the valué of music might consist in its ability to show us how to
be ironic about ourselves, how to be sceptical about our 'skills'. According to him, this comes, mainly, from
the f'act that every possible way to interpret music is relative, in the sense that we have proposed here. It
must be noticed that the 'paradoxes' that Jaroslaw Mianowsky perspicuously uncovers about interpretations
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intend to interpret someone else's work, we must adapt to what we know about it; we
must get rid of our own free will or style in order to approach the one that suits it best -
this is what Eco (1992) has labelled intenctio operis -, and, therefore, we must walk
away from our own self and relativize it once more.
Through all these means, music instructs us how to become strangers to ourselves
(Kristeva, 1988), how to detach and question our own language (De Man, 1986, 83) and
OQ
how to 'be able not to be right'. " An education promoting such valúes will
undoubtedly prepare 21st century citizens to accept contact with other cultures, the
openness of the knowledge society and future migratory movements. Such edificador!
purports, in order to face similar challenges as these, incontrovertible advantages over
the oíd 19th century education, with its economicist and nationalist valúes, which
Nietzsche denounced. Music, thus, undertakes the task of coaching us to live in
multicultural societies, in the tolerance that springs from the knowledge that everyone
(even oneself) is questionable and 'foreign' in a way. We are ready, through this, to
achieve what the French and anthropologists cali dépaysement (literally,
'decountryfying' oneself) and what Italians and postmodernists (Álvarez, 1992) cali
spaesamento ('bewilderment'); namely, the talent of seeing oneself from a relativist
point of view and with a certain distance; the capacity to approach certainties and
oc
dogmas, specially our own ones, with gentle irony and some kind of detachment. " The
in general (as he writes in the article included in the present volume) can also emphasize this penchant of
music to teach us how to be a bit more sceptical about ourselves.
81
 This expression is taken from the deft title of A. Domingo Moratalla's book (1991) about philosophical
hermeneutics. Gadamer himself( l991, 152) insists on this suggestion: "The soul of my hermeneutics is that
I affirm that understanding the other means, to a certain extent, that the other is right. And this transforms
our own self. Thus, in fact I imagine that since we have grown up in this world-wide civiiísation we must
[...] learn to see the possible truth of the reasons of the other and, therefore, learn to doubt about our own
reasons."
See Quintana Paz (2000a), on the problems of nationalist education within the challenges of the 2lst
century.
The kind and well-tempered irony (Vattimo, 1984, 178-179; 2000) about which I am thinking ís very
similar to Cervantes' humane irony, or to the playful, creativc one that F. Schlegel had already related to art
(Allemann, 1956). It does not have anything to do with the sheer sarcasm of Francisco de Quevedo or with
the tragic anguish of K. W. F. Solger. In fact, these last two models owe all their vitriolic ingredients lo a
long-lasting nostalgia for the stable and fixed world of Pre-modern days of yore, nostalgia without any self-
irony. Their bitterness, therefore, is chiefly conservative, since it is unable to overeóme the deceived desire
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more 'foreign' musíc makes us (if, for instance, music comes from a distant
subcommunity, time or space), the more it will edúcate us in the ethics of being self-
ironic.86 Should music keep on diluting our inertial principies and valúes, those
hierarchies we presuppose without noticing, it would gradually help us to foster a non-
hierarchical, non-authoritative society, where life would develop into something less
87
and less oppressive for people who would differ more and more.
4. Adagio Finale
We could find out many other utilities of music once we make up our minds to
disregard 'Schopenhauer as educator' for good, and acknowledge 'Bach and musicians
in general as educators', in the way depicted previously. So far, we have only drawn
attention to a few possible bases in order to accomplish that, but those ought not to be
deemed as definitive, just as if we had disclosed the new definite 'order' of interrelation
between music and the rest of things (the kind of order in which both Pre-moderns and
Moderns believed). That would contradict the ideas we have tried to defend. Since we
no longer have faith in immutable essences, the ideas we have just developed are
historical, mutable, ephemeral and open to discussion, and should I be given a good
reason for it, I would revise them myself ironically, considering them 'alien' and
'foreign' to me. Bach and musicians in general can edúcate us in new astounding ways
that we cannot even imagine: and it is up to them, the musicians, to achieve in practice
the sort of development they should contingently yearn for (a kind of historical longing
that neither this ñor any other essay can wholly, 'essentially', envisage - still less
of a firm order, and, Iherefore, they attempt to find consolation by means of their sour laugh. See Ferrater
Mora (1955), Rorty (1989) and Behler (1990), on the suggested non-vitriolic self-irony.
86
 For this reason. we do not agree with T. W. Adorno (whose view is commented on by Mikulás Bek in the
presen! book) when he says that ancient music is a symbo! of authoritarianism. Instead. we believe that it is
a symbol of anti-authoritartanism (like any remote music), a symbol of the incapacity of our current
hierarchical criteria to reign over all time and space. This music can instruct us in how to doubt everything,
even ourselves and our own presen! authority, when it forces us to change those criteria in order to 'be
understood' in the distance. Within the School of Frankfurt, of which Adorno formed par!, there are also
authors such as Habermas who acknowledge that art in general has this critical and self-critical stance,
similar to the one proposed here (Weber, 1976).
87
 In Quintana Paz (1998a), there is a more detailed elaboration of the kind of society favoured by the fact that
music could make us more sceptical about our own principies.
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decree). This article, thus, has just been an attempt to help some people to cease
expecting from music what Pre-moderns and Moderns-Romantics expected, since, as
we have sought to clarify, waiting for things like this to appear nowadays is like waiting
for Godot. We have also intended to provide a few hints about the new things that Bach
and musicians in general have been teaching us, since the moment when we stopped
asking them to explain the Universe, our inner life or a metaphysical world, as we
previously used to ask.
I would like to finish by tclling a truc short story about the person we have
considered to epitomize this new way of inserting music in education: the musician
Johann Sebastian Bach (although, certainly, we could have picked up many other
masters for that function). According to reliable testimonies (Zeraschi, 1956), when
Bach was 65 he suffered from the eye-illness currently known as cataracts, and he
decided to be operated on by the reputed eye surgeon John Taylor, who was by
coincidence spending some time near Leipzig in that very year, 1650. It must have been
a hard decisión for Bach to make. The operation itself was not too complicated: it
consisted of making an incisión in the middle of the eye using a scalpel in order to
remove from the crystalline the opaque part which brought on his pardal blindness.
What made it hard was the fact that this incisión in the most sensitive part of the eye
had to be made without anaesthesia, as all surgical operations in those times. It was
compulsory, at the same time, for the patient to keep still enough to allow the surgeon
determine the exact points where the cuts would be made. In spite of all this, Bach
accepted to undergo what we would describe as a veritable torture nowadays, and the
removal of his cataract took place without major setbacks in March. After this, John
Taylor covered the patient's eyes to facilítate his recovery. But, subsequently, problems
began: recovery was not so straightforward as it was expected in the first place, and
during four months, four long months of blindness, the surgeon did not allow Bach to
take the bandage off his eyes. Yet, the musician must have got so tired of such a long
period in the dark after such torment, that on the 18th of July he decided to take the risk
and uncover his eyes by himself, in order to see what would happen. The surprise was
breathtaking: He could see perfectly! However, such sudden joy was too much for a
sick man of his age, and only a few hours later he suffered an attack of catalepsy from
which he died ten days later.
The first time I heard this story I thought that what might have affected Bach so
much was not only such sudden happiness. The mere thought that the previous long
period of blindness could have been drastically abridged, if either he or the surgeon
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would have dared to uncover his eyes sooner, must have also represented a violent blow
to his exhausted spirit. And even the thought that, should no one have risked carrying
out such an action, he would have continuad to be in the dark for a long time, must have
left him awestruck.
Nowadays, our Western education is still covered with the bandages of past
mentalities which do not let us face the problems which are right in front of us, even
though we believe that these bandages are protecting us against something or someone.
We may keep such certainties, such protecting bandages on our face, just for fcar of
hurting our eyes if we take them off. But we can also remove them some happy day, and
surprisingly realise that we could have lived in a culture without bandages since long
ago, perceiving the world around us more clearly. Let us only hope that such a bright
day does not come too late, as in the case of Bach.
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